The Intersection of Law, Policy, and Police Body-Worn Cameras: An Exploration of Critical Issues by White, Michael D. & Fradella, Henry F.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 96
Number 5 Badge Cams as Data and Deterrent:
Enforcement, the Public, and the Press in the Age of
Digital Video
Article 9
6-1-2018
The Intersection of Law, Policy, and Police Body-
Worn Cameras: An Exploration of Critical Issues
Michael D. White
Henry F. Fradella
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael D. White & Henry F. Fradella, The Intersection of Law, Policy, and Police Body-Worn Cameras: An Exploration of Critical Issues,
96 N.C. L. Rev. 1579 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol96/iss5/9
96 N.C. L. REV. 1579 (2018) 
THE INTERSECTION OF LAW, POLICY, AND 
POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS: AN 
EXPLORATION OF CRITICAL ISSUES* 
MICHAEL D. WHITE** & HENRY F. FRADELLA*** 
Police body-worn cameras (“BWCs”) have diffused rapidly 
among U.S. law enforcement, in part because of early studies 
which suggested that the technology could produce important 
outcomes for police and their communities. The potential for 
BWCs to produce positive outcomes is affected by a wide range 
of issues tied to program planning and implementation, as all of 
the benefits of BWCs can be short-circuited by poor pre-
deployment decisions. This Article seeks to inform the continued 
diffusion of this technology through a deep examination of BWC 
research and resources. The authors first review the body of 
research on BWCs and describe best practices for planning and 
implementing a BWC program. The authors also highlight the 
importance of administrative policy through a critical review of 
four controversial BWC policy issues: activation, citizen 
notification, officer review of footage, and supervisory review of 
footage. The policy discussion is grounded in reviews of the 
relevant research and the results of an analysis of 129 BWC 
policies. Last, the authors suggest the larger discretion control 
framework in policing offers an important lens for guiding 
officer BWC decision-making. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Law enforcement interest in body-worn cameras can be traced 
back more than a decade. A handful of law enforcement agencies in 
the United Kingdom began experimenting with the technology as 
early as 2005, 1  and several North American law enforcement 
agencies—such as those in Rialto, California; Phoenix, Arizona; and 
Victoria, British Columbia, Canada—piloted BWCs from 2009–2012.2 
A Bureau of Justice Statistics survey in 2013 found that 
approximately one-third of surveyed US law enforcement agencies 
had already deployed BWCs to some of their officers.3 Though early 
interest was grounded primarily in the perceived evidentiary value of 
the cameras, many also recognized the accountability potential of 
BWCs.4 For example, in August 2013 a federal judge included the 
technology as a remedy in the ruling against the New York City 
Police Department’s Stop, Question, Frisk (“SQF”) program.5 
 
 1. See MARTIN GOODALL, POLICE & CRIME STANDARDS DIRECTORATE, 
GUIDANCE FOR THE POLICE USE OF BODY-WORN VIDEO DEVICES 6, 30 (2007), 
http://library.college.police.uk/docs/homeoffice/guidance-body-worn-devices.pdf [https://perma.cc
/GQA6-9HD5]. 
 2. See CHARLES M. KATZ, DAVID E. CHOATE, JUSTIN T. READ, & LIDIA NUÑO, 
CTR. FOR VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND CMTY. SAFETY, EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF 
OFFICER WORN BODY CAMERAS IN THE PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT 5–6 (2014), 
https://publicservice.asu.edu/sites/default/files/ppd_spi_feb_20_2015_final.pdf [https://perma.cc
/8TX7-PUTZ]; MICHAEL D. WHITE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS DIAGNOSTIC CTR., 
POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 17–18 (2014), 
https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p289-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JSD-Y8ED]. 
 3. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2013: EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (2015), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13et.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q4Z-JPWM]. 
 4. See WHITE, supra note 2, at 7, 19–27. 
 5. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“To address 
the violations that I have found, I shall order various remedies including, but not limited 
to,	.	.	. a trial program requiring the use of body-worn cameras in one precinct per 
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The focus on BWCs skyrocketed after the summer of 2014 
sparked, in large part, by a series of citizen deaths at the hands of the 
police—especially those of Eric Garner,6 Michael Brown,7 and Tamir 
Rice8—that generated public outrage and civil disorder in New York 
City; Ferguson, Missouri; and Cleveland, Ohio, respectively,9 leading 
to calls for police reform from civil rights organizations 10  and 
grassroots movements like Black Lives Matter.11 In response to this 
crisis, in late 2014 the White House created the President’s Task 
Force on 21st Century Policing, and former President Obama 
“charged the task force with identifying best practices and offering 
 
borough.”). For more detailed information on this case and the SQF practices challenged 
in it, see MICHAEL D. WHITE & HENRY F. FRADELLA, STOP AND FRISK: THE USE AND 
ABUSE OF A CONTROVERSIAL POLICING TACTIC 89–105 (2016). 
 6. See Jericka Duncan, Eric Garner Case: Video of Chokehold’s Aftermath Raises 
New Questions, CBS NEWS (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/second-tape-of-
nypd-chokehold-raises-new-questions-in-eric-garner-case/ [https://perma.cc/RC7H-656Z]; 
J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict Officer 
in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014
/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokehold-death-of-
eric-garner.html [https://perma.cc/Q8JY-JKJL (dark archive)]. 
 7. See Jon Swaine, Michael Brown Protests in Ferguson Met with Rubber Bullets and 
Teargas, GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/14
/ferguson-police-teargas-rubber-bullets-michael-brown [https://perma.cc/6F82-HHTY]. 
For a detailed overview of Michael Brown’s killing and the aftermath of his death, see 
generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY 
FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj
_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB2Q-GPBH]. 
 8. See Elahe Izadi & Peter Holley, Video Shows Cleveland Officer Shooting 12-Year-
Old Tamir Rice Within Seconds, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/11/26/officials-release-video-
names-in-fatal-police-shooting-of-12-year-old-cleveland-boy/?utm_term=.3fb300e7e289 
[https://perma.cc/7KQW-P35L]. 
 9. See supra notes 6–8. Since 2014, the deaths of Walter Scott, Freddie Gray, Samuel 
Dubose, and others have similarly caused great controversy in additional cities. See 
Haeyoun Park & Jasmine C. Lee, Looking for Accountability in Police-Involved Deaths of 
Blacks, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/07/12/us
/looking-for-accountability-in-police-involved-deaths-of-blacks.html [https://perma.cc
/WQS3-G9TU (dark archive)]. 
 10. See, e.g., Michael Dresser & Luke Broadwater, NAACP, ACLU, Other Groups 
Call for Police Reform in Maryland, BALTIMORE SUN (July 23, 2015); 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-police-panel-20150723
-story.html [https://perma.cc/FN98-2CYV]. 
 11. See, e.g., SUE BRADFORD EDWARDS & DUCHESS HARRIS, BLACK LIVES 
MATTER 88–99 (Arnold Ringstad ed., 2016); CHRISTOPHER J. LEBRON, THE MAKING OF 
BLACK LIVES MATTER: A BRIEF HISTORY OF AN IDEA x–xii (2017); WESLEY LOWERY, 
“THEY CAN’T KILL US ALL”: FERGUSON, BALTIMORE, AND A NEW ERA IN AMERICA’S 
RACIAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 221–36 (2017); KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, FROM 
#BLACKLIVESMATTER TO BLACK LIBERATION 2–6 (2016). 
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recommendations” to build community trust and enhance police 
accountability.12 In May 2015, the Task Force released a final report 
with more than sixty recommendations for change.13 
BWCs have emerged as a mechanism that many believe can 
alleviate the current crisis. Police BWCs were prominently featured in 
the final report recommendations of the 2015 President’s Task Force 
on 21st Century Policing.14 BWCs were also a central tenet of former 
President Obama’s community policing plan.15 Moreover, since 2015 
the United States Department of Justice (“US DOJ”) has awarded 
nearly $60 million in grant funding to more than 250 law enforcement 
agencies to deploy BWCs.16 Some evidence suggests that use of 
BWCs is supported across a diverse range of other key stakeholders 
including police leadership organizations, 17  civil rights groups 
(including the American Civil Liberties Union), 18  police officers 
themselves,19 and citizens.20 Though there are no definitive counts of 
 
 12. OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., FINAL REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 1 (2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov
/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/ENS5-5LQL]. The President’s 
Task Force scheduled public hearings throughout the US and heard testimony from 
scholars, advocates, citizens, and police leaders. See id. at 5. 
 13. Id. at 85–98. 
 14. Id. at 31–32.  
 15. See David Hudson, Building Trust Between Communities and Local Police. 
WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/12/01
/building-trust-between-communities-and-local-police [https://perma.cc/92N6-9ZBN]. 
 16. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UPDATE: FISCAL 
YEAR 2016 (2017), https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs/BWCPIP-Factsheet-2016-Update-
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3ZB-VCMM]. In December 2014, President Obama pledged 
$75 million to deploy 50,000 BWCs across the United States. Carrie Dann & Andrew 
Rafferty, Obama Requests $263 Million for Police Body Cameras, Training, NBC NEWS 
(Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/obama-requests-263-million-
police-body-cameras-training-n259161 [https://perma.cc/4YG8-DRLP]. 
 17. See INT’L ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, BODY-WORN CAMERAS MODEL 
POLICY 1–3 (2014), http://www.theiacp.org/model-policy/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2017
/07/BodyWornCamerasPolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PA7-H9K9]. 
 18. See JAY STANLEY, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, POLICE BODY-MOUNTED 
CAMERAS: WITH RIGHT POLICIES IN PLACE, A WIN FOR ALL 2 (2015), https://www.aclu.org
/sites/default/files/assets/police_body-mounted_cameras-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/89MU-Y96N] 
(“[BWCs] have the potential to be a win-win, helping protect the public against police 
misconduct, and at the same time helping protect police against false accusations of 
abuse.”). 
 19. See Janne E. Gaub, David E. Choate, Natalie Todak, Charles M. Katz & Michael 
D. White, Officer Perceptions of Body-Worn Cameras Before and After Deployment: A 
Study of Three Departments, 19 POLICE Q. 275, 283 (2016) (finding that police officers in 
all three surveyed police departments “believed that BWCs have evidentiary value”); 
Wesley G. Jennings, Lorie Fridell & Mathew D. Lynch, Cops and Cameras: Officer 
Perceptions of the Use of Body-Worn Cameras in Law Enforcement, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 549, 
549 (2014) (“[O]fficers generally reported considerably high rates of agreement to 
questions such as they believe that their agency should adopt body-worn cameras for all of 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1579 (2018) 
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the number of law enforcement agencies that have deployed BWCs 
by 2017, some experts estimate that nearly all police departments will 
adopt the technology within the next three to five years.21 
The rapid diffusion of BWCs in law enforcement has also been 
driven by findings from a handful of early research studies, which 
suggested cameras can lead to substantial reductions in citizen 
complaints and use of force by police.22 A 2013 evaluation of the 
Rialto Police Department in California documented a nearly ninety 
percent drop in citizen complaints against police and an over sixty 
percent decline in use of force following deployment of BWCs.23 
Other positive results emerged from studies of police departments in 
Mesa, Arizona;24 Orlando, Florida;25 and Phoenix, Arizona.26 Several 
other studies also found that BWCs can lead to enhanced court case 
processing times and outcomes.27 
 
their police officers, and that they would feel comfortable wearing body-worn cameras.”). 
It should be noted, however, that even in these studies, only some police officers support 
BWCs, and of those officers, their support is often qualified. 
 20. See Matthew S. Crow, Jamie A. Snyder, Vaughn J. Crichlow & John Ortiz 
Smykla, Community Perceptions of Police Body-Worn Cameras: The Impact of Views on 
Fairness, Fear, Performance, and Privacy, 44 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 589, 590 (2017) 
(“Anecdotal evidence and limited research suggest that the public supports BWCs, but the 
factors driving public support remain unknown.”); William H. Sousa, Terance D. Miethe 
& Mari Sakiyama, Inconsistencies in Public Opinion of Body-Worn Cameras on Police: 
Transparency, Trust, and Improved Police-Citizen Relationships, 12 POLICING: J. POL’Y & 
PRAC. 100, 108 (2018) (analyzing public opinion of BWCs and concluding that “citizens 
are supportive of BWCs in policing”). 
 21. Kriston Capps, Police Body Cameras: Coming Everywhere in 3 to 5 Years, 
CITYLAB (July 30, 2015), http://www.citylab.com/crime/2015/07/police-body-cameras-
coming-everywhere-in-3-to-5-years/399992/ [https://perma.cc/5MHU-C5UZ]. 
 22. See WHITE, supra note 2, at 20–23. 
 23. Barak Ariel, William A. Farrar & Alex Sutherland, The Effect of Police Body-
Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police: A 
Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 509, 523–24 (2015). 
 24. See RYAN STOKES & LEE RANKIN, MESA POLICE DEPARTMENT, PROGRAM 
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: ON-OFFICER BODY CAMERA SYSTEM 8–9 
(2013), http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/LEIM/Operational%20Track
%20Workshops/O2%20On%20Body%20Cameras.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CAC-CQCX]. 
 25. See Wesley G. Jennings, Mathew D. Lynch & Lorie Fridell, Evaluating the Impact 
of Police Officer Body-Worn Cameras (BWCs) on Response-to-Resistance and Serious 
External Complaints: Evidence from the Orlando Police Department (OPD) Experience 
Utilizing a Randomized Controlled Experiment, 43 J. CRIM. JUST. 480, 485 (2015) (“Taken 
together, the results from this methodologically rigorous, randomized experiment all point 
toward the effectiveness of BWCs for improving police-community relations and reducing 
a host of tragic events that can result from negative police-citizen encounters.”). 
 26. See KATZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 33 (finding a 22.5% decline in officially 
recorded complaints). 
 27. See ODS CONSULTING, BODY WORN VIDEO PROJECTS IN PAISLEY AND 
ABERDEEN 9 (2011), http://www.bwvsg.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/BWV-Scottish-
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HFH-TK3M] (suggesting that BWCs increased the 
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More recent research, however, demonstrates that positive 
outcomes are not always guaranteed, and BWCs are not uniformly 
desired. Several 2015 studies have documented no significant impact 
on use of force and citizen complaints.28 Ariel and colleagues found a 
troubling link between BWCs and increased rates of assaults on 
officers.29 In August 2016, the Boston Police Patrolman’s Association 
sought a court injunction to stop the department leadership from 
creating a mandatory BWC program, claiming that it would “subject 
unwilling officers to increased risks.”30 More generally, critics of 
BWCs point to a complex range of issues including: citizen privacy, 
cost and resource commitment, training and policy requirements, and 
operational concerns (e.g., failure to activate).31 
The emerging picture suggests that the potential for BWCs to 
produce positive outcomes may be affected by a wide range of issues 
tied to program planning and implementation.32 There is a long 
 
likelihood of guilty pleas in Scotland); CATHERINE OWENS, DAVID MANN & RORY 
MCKENNA, THE ESSEX BODY WORN VIDEO TRIAL 1–2 (2014), 
http://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Documents/BWV_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc
/2PSU-547B] (finding that the presence of a BWC increased the likelihood that an 
individual would be criminally charged). 
 28. See EDMONTON POLICE SERV., BODY WORN VIDEO: CONSIDERING THE 
EVIDENCE 8 (2015), http://www.bwvsg.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Edmonton-
Police-BWV-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4FF-6EVZ] (finding “no quantitative 
evidence” suggesting that BWCs impacted complaints or use of force); LYNNE 
GROSSMITH, CATHERINE OWENS, WILL FINN, DAVID MANN, TOM DAVIES & LAURA 
BAIKA, POLICE, CAMERA, EVIDENCE: LONDON’S CLUSTER RANDOMISED 
CONTROLLED TRIAL OF BODY WORN VIDEO 15, 17 (2015), 
http://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Documents/Police_Camera_Evidence.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C98Y-3ZCT] (finding BWCs had a small but positive impact on citizen 
complaints, but no impact on use of force) . 
 29. Barak Ariel et al., Wearing Body Cameras Increases Assaults Against Officers and 
Does Not Reduce Police Use of Force: Results from a Global Multi-Site Experiment, 13 
EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 744, 750 (2016). 
 30. Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 17, Boston Police Patrolmen’s 
Ass’n v. City of Boston, No. 16-2670-B (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 2016). In denying the 
injunction request, the court noted that “[a]t best	.	.	. the state of the research [on BWCs] 
is inconclusive, particularly as to implementation of BWCs in Boston.” Id. 
 31. See Brian Bakst & Ryan J. Foley, For Police Body Cameras, Big Costs Loom in 
Storage, POLICEONE (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.policeone.com/police-products/body-
cameras/articles/8243271-For-police-body-cameras-big-costs-loom-in-storage/ [https://perma.cc
/6XF4-VMD4]; Andrew Gorosko, Police Acquisition of Body-Worn Cameras Delayed, 
NEWTOWN BEE (Jan. 8, 2018), https://newtownbee.com/police-acquisition-of-body-worn-
cameras-delayed/ [https://perma.cc/2JGD-R2BB]; Peter Hermann, Oversight Board Finds 
Many D.C. Officers Fail to Properly Use Body Cameras, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/oversight-board-finds-many-dc-officers-
fail-to-properly-use-body-cameras/2017/10/31/5742ec38-bd81-11e7-8444-a0d4f04b89eb
_story.html?utm_term=.6e2861d42de3 [https://perma.cc/6BFA-UYLU (dark archive)]. 
 32. Cf. Michael D. White, Janne E. Gaub & Natalie Todak, Exploring the Potential 
for Body-Worn Cameras to Reduce Violence in Police-Citizen Encounters, 12 POLICING: J. 
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history of implementation failures in criminal justice 
programming33—sometimes with harmful consequences.34 Given the 
speed at which law enforcement agencies are adopting BWCs, the 
consequences of poor BWC program implementation are significant, 
from resistance among line officers to low usage by downstream 
criminal justice actors and backlash from citizens. Simply put, all of 
the benefits of BWCs can quickly be eroded by poor planning, 
implementation failures, and ill-advised decisions on operational 
issues covered in policy. 
This Article seeks to inform the continued diffusion of this 
technology through a deep examination of BWC research and 
resources. In Part I, the authors first review the body of empirical 
research on BWCs and highlight variation in the planning for and 
implementation of these cameras as a cause for the mixed findings 
across studies. With that premise as a backdrop, the authors then 
describe three critically important factors that will shape the success 
of an agency’s BWC program. First, in Part II, the authors address 
BWC planning and implementation. In May 2015, the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance (“BJA”) rolled out a national “Body-Worn 
Camera Toolkit.”35 The BJA’s Toolkit is designed to provide a wide 
range of information about BWCs, and it includes a “Law 
Enforcement Implementation Checklist”36 to serve as a best-practices 
guide for successful planning and implementation of a BWC 
program.37 Adherence to the best-practices guide should optimize the 
likelihood of successful BWC implementation. 
 
POL’Y & PRAC. 66, 73 (2018) (observing that mixed results produced by BWC studies may 
be partially attributable to the implementation of new policies). 
 33. See DANIEL P. MEARS, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY: AN 
EVALUATION APPROACH TO INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS 131–
32 (2010); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING EVALUATION OF ANTICRIME 
PROGRAMS 45 (Mark W. Lipsey, John L. Adams, Denise C. Gottfredson, John V. Pepper 
& David L. Weisburd eds., 2005); Edward E. Rhine, Tina L. Mawhorr & Evalyn C. Parks, 
Implementation: The Bane of Effective Correctional Programs, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 347, 349–50 (2006). 
 34. See Brandon C. Welsh & Michael Rocque, When Crime Prevention Harms: A 
Review of Systematic Reviews, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 245, 261–62 (2014). 
 35. Body-Worn Camera Program, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE’S JUSTICE 
TODAY (May 2015), https://www.bja.gov/JusticeToday/5_2015_newsletter.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q3GR-U55E]; see Body-Worn Camera Toolkit, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
ASSISTANCE, https://www.bja.gov/bwc/ [https://perma.cc/JM4Z-525L]. 
 36. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, BODY-WORN CAMERA TOOLKIT: LAW 
ENFORCEMENT IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST (2015), https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs
/BWCImplementationChecklist.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SVU-YA9L]. 
 37. One of the authors, Michael D. White, was involved in the creation of the national 
Body-Worn Camera Toolkit and Law Enforcement Implementation Checklist. He also 
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Second, the authors place special emphasis on policy 
development in Part III. The US DOJ has funded a Training and 
Technical Assistance (“TTA”) team to support law enforcement 
agencies receiving federal BWC funds.38 One of the core areas of 
TTA support involves policy development.39 The TTA team has 
developed a BWC policy review “scorecard” (“BJA Scorecard”) that 
rates the comprehensiveness of BWC policy across forty-one specific 
issues, covering eleven general areas. 40  The US DOJ policy 
development and review process offers a model for law enforcement 
agencies to follow in order to optimize the potential for a successful 
BWC program. 
Third, a number of specific BWC policy issues are controversial 
and complex, drawing on questions of both state and federal law. 
Agency decisions on specific policy issues are of great importance to 
the vitality of a BWC program. In Part IV, the authors investigate 
four controversial BWC policy issues: (1) officer activation of the 
BWC; (2) citizen notification of the BWC (by the officer); (3) officer 
authority to review BWC footage; and (4) supervisor review of BWC 
footage. For each, the authors describe the complex policy and legal 
issues at play. The authors then describe national trends in agency 
policy and practice for each issue based on an analysis of 129 BWC 
policies from agencies funded through the US DOJ. Last, in Part V, 
the authors place BWC use in a larger discretion control framework 
and draw on a robust body of policing research to offer 
recommendations on how to properly guide, manage, and control 
officer BWC decision-making. 
I.  BODY-WORN CAMERA RESEARCH TO DATE 
Advocates have made numerous claims regarding the benefits of 
BWCs. One of the most prominent claims is that cameras can reduce 
violence during police-citizen encounters, resulting in fewer citizen 
 
serves as Co-Director of Training and Technical Assistance to BJA’s BWC funding 
program (called the “Policy and Implementation Program”). 
 38. About Us, BODY-WORN CAMERA TRAINING & TECH. ASSISTANCE, 
http://www.bwctta.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/YBB5-6LDF]. 
 39. Training and Technical Assistance, BODY-WORN CAMERA TRAINING & TECH. 
ASSISTANCE, http://www.bwctta.com/training-and-technical-assistance [https://perma.cc
/6VRX-86UE]. 
 40. Body-Worn Camera Policy Review Scorecard, BODY-WORN CAMERA TRAINING 
& TECH. ASSISTANCE, http://www.bwctta.com/resources/bwc-resources/body-worn-
camera-policy-review-scorecard [https://perma.cc/6533-ZVR2]. 
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complaints against police and less use of force by officers.41 A number 
of early studies suggested the technology could produce measurable 
change with regard to these two important outcomes. For instance, 
Ariel and colleagues reported dramatic year-to-year declines in 
citizen complaints (88%) and use of force (58.3%) following 
deployment of BWCs.42 Jennings, Lynch, and Fridell examined “pre-
post” rates of force and complaints among a group of forty-six 
officers, reporting declines of more than 50% for use of force and 
65% for citizen complaints following BWC deployment.43 White, 
Gaub, and Todak conducted a similar study in Spokane, Washington 
and found similarly positive results, though the declines in complaints 
and use of force disappeared after six months.44 They also found 
BWCs had no effect on officer injuries. Studies in Mesa, Arizona;45 
Tampa, Florida;46 and the United Kingdom47 have also documented 
consistent reductions in these measures. Hedberg and colleagues 
estimated the effect of BWCs on citizen complaints in Phoenix, 
Arizona, and concluded, “if BWCs are employed as prescribed [i.e., 
100% activation compliance], a majority of complaints against officers 
would be eliminated.”48 
 
 41. See WHITE, supra note 2, at 20–23 (citing to several BWC proponents who claim 
that these cameras “will change police officer behavior during encounters with citizens”). 
 42. Ariel et al., supra note 23, at 524. 
 43. Jennings et al., supra note 25, at 480. 
 44. White et al., supra note 32, at 1, 5–6, 8 (“Following BWC deployment, the 
percentage of officers with a complaint in each group declined by 50% and 78% (Control 
and Treatment, respectively); the percentage of officers with a use of force declined 
notably (39%) for one group only.”). 
 45. STOKES & RANKIN, supra note 24, at 8. 
 46. Dan Sullivan & Tony Marrero, USF Study Suggests Tampa Police with Body 
Cameras Less Likely to Use Force, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016), 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/usf-study-suggests-tampa-police-with-body-
cameras-less-likely-to-use-force/2290851 [https://perma.cc/G4AS-BFQB] (“The reduction 
among the 60 officers who wore cameras amounts to about 20 fewer incidents of physical 
force per year, according to the study. The authors speculate that if the cameras were 
worn by the entire department, the same reduction would translate to about 250 fewer 
incidents per year.”). 
 47. See GOODALL, supra note 1, at 7–8 (“In a number of cases the complainants have 
reconsidered their complaint after this review, thus reducing investigation time for 
unwarranted complaints.”); TOM ELLIS, CRAIG JENKINS & PAUL SMITH, EVALUATION 
OF THE INTRODUCTION OF PERSONAL ISSUE BODY WORN VIDEO CAMERAS 
(OPERATION HYPERION) ON THE ISLE OF WIGHT 2–3 (2015), 
https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/portal/files/2197790/Operation_Hyperion_Final_Report_to
_Hampshire_Constabulary.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QBQ-AJ74] (finding that, after BWCs 
were implemented, the number of low-level and high-level complaints decreased). 
 48. Eric C. Hedberg, Charles M. Katz & David E. Choate, Body-Worn Cameras and 
Citizen Interactions with Police Officers: Estimating Plausible Effects Given Varying 
Compliance Levels, 34 JUST. Q. 627, 642 (2017). 
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Several studies have also highlighted the evidentiary value of 
BWCs. A Scottish study found that BWC cases were approximately 
seventy to eighty percent “less likely to go to trial” than cases that did 
not involve BWCs.49 Goodall reported that BWCs led to quicker 
resolutions of cases, less officer time devoted to paperwork, and more 
time spent on patrol.50 Morrow and colleagues concluded that BWCs 
enhanced criminal justice outcomes for domestic violence cases in 
Phoenix, Arizona,51 and a study in Essex, England, reported similar 
findings.52 
Research has also shown that some police officers are supportive 
of BWCs, though the level of such support varies by department and 
tends to increase after deployment.53 Studies have similarly shown 
that citizen support for BWCs is high, among both the general 
population54 and citizens who have had BWC-recorded encounters 
with police.55 White, Todak, and Gaub found an intriguing connection 
between citizen awareness of a BWC and increased perceptions of 
procedural justice, thereby “providing a preliminary piece of evidence 
that BWCs may be able to deliver on the claim the technology can 
enhance police legitimacy.”56 
However, several recent studies have failed to document positive 
effects across a range of outcomes. A study by the Edmonton, 
Alberta, Canada, Police Service concluded that BWCs had no 
measurable impact on citizen complaints or use of force.57 Grossmith 
and colleagues found a statistically significant decline in citizen 
complaints in only two of the ten London police boroughs 
 
 49. ODS CONSULTING, supra note 27, at 10. 
 50. GOODALL, supra note 1, at 7. 
 51. Weston J. Morrow, Charles M. Katz & David E. Choate, Assessing the Impact of 
Police Body-Worn Cameras on Arresting, Prosecuting, and Convicting Suspects of Intimate 
Partner Violence, 19 POLICE Q. 303, 316–18 (2016) (finding that the evidentiary value of 
BWCs aids in the prosecution and conviction of domestic violence offenders). 
 52. OWENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 15 (“The data suggest that the presence of the 
camera increases the probability of an individual being charged (as opposed to other 
forms of disposal), at all risk levels, but the effect is most noticeable for the lower risk 
cases.”). 
 53. See Gaub et al., supra note 19, at 283–92; Jennings et al., supra note 19, at 552–54. 
 54. See Crow et al., supra note 20, at 599–600; Sousa et al., supra note 20, at 4–6. 
 55. Michael D. White, Natalie Todak & Janne E. Gaub, Assessing Citizen Perceptions 
of Body-Worn Cameras After Encounters with Police, 40 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE 
STRATEGIES & MGMT. 689, 694–95 (2017) (surveying citizens who had BWC-recorded 
encounters and finding that “more than 80 percent agreed/strongly agreed that the officer 
acted professionally, and 72.9 percent indicated they believed the officer cared about their 
well-being”). 
 56. Id. at 699. 
 57. EDMONTON POLICE SERV., supra note 28, at 8. 
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examined.58 Ariel and colleagues reported mixed findings regarding 
use of force across ten BWC studies, leading to an “overall null use-
of-force result.”59 The same study also found a troubling link between 
BWCs and increased rates of assaults on officers.60 In a subsequent 
article, Ariel and colleagues argued that the effects of BWCs are 
determined by a delicate balance between officer discretion and 
deterrence, and any imbalance between these issues can undermine 
the benefits of BWCs.61 
Several studies have also highlighted the importance of clear, 
enforceable guidelines governing BWC use. The Mesa Police 
Department reported BWC activations declined by 42% after the 
adoption of a policy that vested officers with high levels of discretion 
regarding when to activate their BWCs.62 Hedberg and colleagues 
reported that Phoenix police officers failed to turn on their BWCs in 
more than two-thirds of encounters where activation was required by 
policy.63 McClure and colleagues reported officer activation rates 
from as low as 1.5% to as high as 65%, demonstrating how officers 
within a single department can vary significantly in their levels of 
compliance with BWC policy.64 Ariel and associates tied patterns in 
use of force to officer decisions on BWC activation.65 That is, when 
officers followed policy—i.e., when they activated the BWC at the 
start of citizen encounters and advised citizens of the BWC—use of 
force declined by nearly 40%.66 When officers did not follow policy, 
use of force actually increased by more than 70%.67 Several studies 
have also found that citizens are not always aware of the BWC’s 
 
 58. GROSSMITH ET AL., supra note 28, at 15. 
 59. Ariel et al., supra note 29, at 750–52. 
 60. Id. at 750–53. 
 61. Barak Ariel, Alex Sutherland, Darren Henstock, Josh Young & Gabriela 
Sosinski, The Deterrence Spectrum: Explaining Why Police Body-Worn Cameras ‘Work’ or 
‘Backfire’ in Aggressive Police–Public Encounters, 12 POLICING: J. POL’Y & PRAC. 6, 6 
(2018) (“[T]he deterrent effect of BWCs is a function of discretion, whereby strong 
discretion is inversely linked to a weak deterrent effect that consequently leads to more 
use of force, and weak discretion is inversely linked to a strong deterrent effect and less 
forceful police responses.”). 
 62. See STOKES & RANKIN, supra note 24, at 13. 
 63. See Hedberg et al., supra note 48, at 640, 644–45. 
 64. DAVE MCCLURE, NANCY LA VIGNE, MATTHEW LYNCH, LAURA GOLIAN, 
DANIEL LAWRENCE & AILI MALM, HOW BODY CAMERAS AFFECT COMMUNITY 
MEMBERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE 7–9 (2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files
/publication/91331/2001307-how-body-cameras-affect-community-members-perceptions-of
-police_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BEG2-9SYH]. 
 65. See Ariel et al., supra note 61, at 9–12. 
 66. Id. at 8. 
 67. Id. 
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presence during the encounter, either because officers do not 
announce the camera’s presence or because citizens are in a mental or 
physical state (e.g., angry, intoxicated, mentally ill, in-crisis) that 
inhibits their understanding of the officer’s BWC notification.68 
Research testing the effect of BWCs on officer activity levels has 
also been mixed. Two studies from the United Kingdom concluded 
that BWCs had no significant impact on officer arrest activity.69 Katz 
and colleagues reported increased arrests among BWC officers,70 but 
Ready and Young found BWC officers conducted fewer stops and 
made fewer arrests but issued more citations. 71  McClure and 
colleagues also found BWC officers made slightly fewer arrests, 
compared to non-BWC officers. 72  Moreover, officers (and their 
unions) have protested the deployment of BWCs in a handful of 
major police departments across the country––including Boston, Las 
Vegas, and New York City––arguing that the technology endangers 
officer safety or that it must be negotiated through collective 
bargaining because of its major impact on officers’ working 
conditions.73 
The evidentiary value of BWCs can also be short-circuited by 
both human and technological issues.74 First, if an officer forgets or 
chooses not to activate a BWC, then no evidentiary benefit can be 
seen from the camera’s use. Moreover, even if a camera is activated, 
the value of this footage may be diminished or eliminated altogether 
based on the camera angle if, for instance, the officer’s “shooting 
platform” blocks the camera.75 Similarly, “[d]uring foot pursuits and 
struggles with residents, the video from a BWC can become 
 
 68. See White et al., supra note 55, at 692, 696 (finding that when officers were not 
required to inform citizens they were being recorded, only twenty-eight percent were 
aware of BWCs); MCCLURE ET AL., supra note 64, at 4–5 (concluding that forty-three 
percent of citizens who had interacted with officers could not remember whether the 
officer was wearing a BWC). 
 69. GROSSMITH ET AL., supra note 28, at 13; OWENS ET AL., supra note 27, at 1–2. 
 70. KATZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 31–32. 
 71. Justin T. Ready & Jacob T. N. Young, The Impact of On-Officer Video Cameras 
on Police–Citizen Contacts: Findings from a Controlled Experiment in Mesa, AZ, 11 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 445, 454 (2015). 
 72. MCCLURE ET AL., supra note 64, at 8 (“Officers assigned a BWC made about 0.35 
fewer arrests every two weeks (14 days) than those not assigned a BWC.”). 
 73. See WHITE, supra note 2, at 28–29; supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 74. See Michael D. White & James Coldren, Body-Worn Police Cameras: Separating 
Fact from Fiction, PUB. MGMT. (PM) MAGAZINE, Mar. 2017, at 6, 7 (explaining how 
“expectations must be realistic as BWCs have limitations, both human and 
technological”). 
 75. Id. at 9. A “shooting platform” is described as “a shooting stance with 
outstretched arms often will block a chest-mounted BWC.” Id. 
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unwatchable	.	.	. or the device can fall off the officer.”76 Accordingly, 
the mobility of BWCs, while considered an advantage over dashboard 
cameras, may ultimately prove to be more of a deficit than a benefit.77 
II.  PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The mixed findings across BWC studies may be explained, at 
least in part, by variation in BWC program implementation.78 Proper 
planning and implementation of a BWC program is a necessary 
precondition for achieving positive outcomes. However, a BWC 
program is a highly complex undertaking. BWCs require an 
enormous investment of resources.79 The technology touches virtually 
every aspect of internal and external police operations.80 BWCs also 
bring into play a range of sensitive issues such as citizen privacy, 
public records laws, and the recording of vulnerable populations.81 
Additionally, BWCs are often adopted in contentious political and 
social environments. 82  These difficulties are compounded by the 
serious consequences of poor BWC program implementation, 
including resistance among line officers and unions, low BWC 
activation rates among officers, problems with technology integration 
and data storage, unintended costs (financial and otherwise), little or 
no usage by downstream criminal justice actors (i.e., prosecutors), and 
backlash from citizens.83 In short, BWC implementation comes with 
both a high degree of difficulty and significant risks if implemented 
poorly. 
Given the gravity of the issues at play, the US DOJ, through the 
BJA, has developed resources to assist law enforcement agencies with 
BWC implementation, including a “National Body-Worn Camera 
Toolkit” (the “Toolkit”) and a “Law Enforcement Implementation 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See White et al., supra note 32, at 9 (noting that policy changes accompanying 
BWC implementation may have influenced the study’s results). 
 79. WHITE, supra note 2, at 9. Aside from the “direct costs associated with purchasing 
the hardware (from $800 to $1,000 per camera)[,]” BWC’s also “produce an enormous 
amount of video data that must be properly and securely stored.” Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 7. 
 82. See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text; see also WHITE, supra note 2, at 19 
(explaining how BWCs have traditionally been viewed as a way to promote transparency 
and therefore “increase perceptions of police legitimacy”). 
 83. See generally NATALIE TODAK, JANNE E. GAUB & MICHAEL D. WHITE, WHAT 
HAPPENS DOWNSTREAM? EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS OF BODY-WORN 
CAMERAS (2017) (detailing external stakeholders’ perceptions of BWCs and how BWCs 
impact their “daily work practices”). 
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Checklist” (the “Checklist”).84 The Checklist outlines a series of 
principles that should guide the development of a BWC program.85 
These BWC principles are consistent with the larger evidence base on 
successful program implementation in the criminal justice system,86 
including policing,87 courts,88 and corrections.89 Adherence to these 
principles should lead to successful BWC implementation, which, in 
turn, should optimize the likelihood of achieving positive outcomes. 
In simple terms, the principles delineated in the Checklist provide a 
roadmap for agencies to follow in order to avoid implementation 
failure. 
As explained in this Part, the Checklist identifies six core 
principles intended to help guide the creation and implementation of 
 
 84. See Body Worn Camera Program, supra note 35; BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
ASSISTANCE, supra note 36. 
 85. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36. 
 86. See, e.g., AMANDA CISSNER & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., AVOIDING FAILURES OF 
IMPLEMENTATION 5 (2009), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/Failure
%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAR4-DXFF] (emphasizing the importance of a 
formalized operational model); PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, IMPLEMENTATION 
OVERSIGHT FOR EVIDENCE-BASED PROGRAMS 3–10 (2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~
/media/assets/2016/05/rf_programimplementationbrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZT6R-NVV9] 
(recommending “four key steps to strengthen implementation of evidence-based 
programs”); J. Mitchell Miller & Holly Ventura Miller, Rethinking Program Fidelity for 
Criminal Justice, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 339, 343 (2015) (noting the US DOJ’s 
focus on “developing and promoting evidence-driven organizational cultures”). 
 87. See, e.g., MELISSA REULAND, A GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTING POLICE-BASED 
DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 28–31 (2004), 
http://www.pacenterofexcellence.pitt.edu/documents/A%20Guide%20to%20Implementin
g%20Police-Based%20Diversion%20Programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/3E6N-TCA2] 
(explaining implementation challenges for mental health police-based response model); 
SUSAN SADD & RANDOLPH M. GRINC, INNOVATIVE NEIGHBORHOOD-ORIENTED 
POLICING: DESCRIPTIONS OF PROGRAMS IN EIGHT CITIES 1 (1994), 
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/innovative-neighborhood
-oriented-policing-descriptions-of-programs-in-eight-cities/legacy_downloads/1268a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/63F2-L423] (detailing results of eight community policing programs 
aimed at reducing demand for drugs). 
 88. See, e.g., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAM 
IMPLEMENTATION 14–22 (2010), https://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-reports/Pretrial
%20Services%20Starter%20Kit%20-%20PJI%202010.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD7Y-3MP7] 
(providing checklist and explaining steps for implementing “a fully functioning pretrial 
services program”); Lisa S. Nored, Philip E. Carlan & Doug Goodman, Incentives and 
Obstacles to Drug Court Implementation: Observations of Drug Court Judges and 
Administrators, JUST. POL’Y J., Spring 2009, at 1, 18, http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj
/documents/incentives_and.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3KT-874R] (examining drug court 
program implementation). 
 89. See, e.g., JANET RENO, RAYMOND C. FISHER, LAURIE ROBINSON & NANCY E. 
GIST, CRITICAL ELEMENTS IN THE PLANNING, DEVELOPMENT, AND IMPLEMENTATION 
OF SUCCESSFUL CORRECTIONAL OPTIONS 27–33 (1998), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles
/168966.pdf [https://perma.cc/QAV5-3MRH] (providing implementation guidelines for 
successful, cost-effective correctional options). 
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BWC programs: learn the fundamentals and develop a plan; form a 
working group; develop policy; define the technology solution 
(procurement strategy); communicate with and educate stakeholders; 
and execute phased roll-out/implementation.90  
A. Learn the Fundamentals and Develop a Plan 
A BWC program should be carefully planned. 91  Agency 
leadership should identify the outcomes it are seeking to achieve with 
BWCs (transparency, accountability, etc.), as the specific goals may 
significantly alter the BWC program’s structure.92 Agency leaders 
should have a clear understanding of the benefits and limitations of 
BWCs, as well as what resources are required to operate a BWC 
program.93 The Checklist recommends that agency leaders engage all 
relevant stakeholders, internal and external, in the planning process.94 
The Checklist also highlights the importance of selecting a project 
manager and developing a project plan and timeline with 
milestones.95 
B. Form a Working Group 
The Checklist recommends creating a “Working Group,” 
comprised of stakeholders, to guide the entire BWC planning 
process.96 The Working Group should meet regularly to ensure that 
the project timeline and budget are maintained.97 The Group should 
include representatives from all units in the agency to gather insights, 
 
 90. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 1–3. 
 91. Id. at 1. 
 92. Id.; see also PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 86, at 4 (“The choice of which 
programs to implement should be based on a clear vision of the desired outcomes and the 
underlying causes of the problems, which can vary from one community to the next.”); 
RENO, ET AL., supra note 89, at 9 (“[I]t is .	.	. important to consider the values and goals of 
the criminal justice system in which the option is being planned.”). 
 93. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 1; BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
ASSISTANCE, BODY-WORN CAMERA TOOLKIT: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 42 
(2015), https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs/BWC_FAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/42GM-ENA2] 
[hereinafter BJA FAQs]. 
 94. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 1; see also CISSNER & 
FAROLE, supra note 86, at 5–6 (suggesting that criminal justice programs “[b]e strategic 
about when and how to engage stakeholders in the planning process”). 
 95. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 1. 
 96. Id. at 1–2; see also RENO, ET AL., supra note 89, at 6 (suggesting the formation of a 
“working group to carry out the daily tasks involved in planning the program”). 
 97. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 1–2; see also CISSNER & 
FAROLE, supra note 86, at 7 (noting that timeline adjustments may be necessary if the 
group begins falling behind schedule). 
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questions, and concerns from all relevant parties.98 Comprehensive 
participation will help overcome internal resistance and troubleshoot 
problems as they arise. The Working Group should also engage with 
external stakeholders, especially the city and county prosecutor, city 
leadership, advocacy groups, and citizens.99 
C. Develop Policy 
A comprehensive administrative policy is critically important for 
a successful BWC program.100 The Working Group should review 
relevant local, state, and federal law. 101  The Group should also 
examine other agency policies, as well as model policies from the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (“IACP”) and the 
United Kingdom Home Office.102 Policy development should be an 
inclusive process, and the policy should be flexible as changes may be 
required based on feedback from stakeholders. 103  The Checklist 
highlights six core areas for which BWC policy should be defined: 
video capture (activation, consent); video viewing (supervisor, 
officer); video use (evidence); video public release; video storage, and 
process/data audits and controls.104 The authors further explore the 
comprehensiveness of BWC policy in Part IV. 
D. Define the Technology Solution (Procurement) 
Most jurisdictions have developed a formal procurement process 
to guide the purchase of equipment such as BWCs. 105  The 
procurement process becomes a central task for the Working 
Group. 106  This process starts with an assessment of current 
capabilities, including: the hardware and software needs or limitations 
 
 98. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 1–2; BJA FAQs, supra 
note 93, at 6, 32. 
 99. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 1–2. 
 100. See id. at 2; BJA FAQs, supra note 93, at 26. 
 101. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 2; BJA FAQs, supra note 
93, at 39. 
 102. BJA FAQs, supra note 93, at 26. 
 103. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 2. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See BJA FAQs, supra note 93, at 17. For a discussion of procurement issues 
related to BWCs, see Heather R. Cotter, Contemporary Issues in Policing: Why Police 
Need to Strategically Plan for Technology Procurement, POLICEONE.COM (Nov. 23, 2016), 
https://www.policeone.com/police-products/body-cameras/articles/243486006-Why-police-
need-to-strategically-plan-for-technology-procurement/ [https://perma.cc/JW96-CEC6]. 
 106. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 2–3; BJA FAQs, supra 
note 93, at 17. 
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(such as camera resolution); financial constraints; and data storage.107 
These issues are typically delineated in a Request for Proposals 
(“RFP”) that is released to BWC vendors.108 Bids submitted by 
vendors are then reviewed, scored, and discussed among the Working 
Group until there is consensus on vendor selection.109 
E. Educate Stakeholders 
The Checklist recommends a strong communication plan to 
publicize the BWC program among a diverse array of stakeholders.110 
An internally-focused marketing campaign can facilitate BWC 
deployment by addressing officers’ concerns.111 A similar campaign 
targeted towards external stakeholders can address questions among 
citizens, advocacy groups, and other criminal justice actors.112 In some 
cases, the media can be used to publicize and engage the public in the 
BWC program.113 The marketing campaign, while best determined by 
local agencies,114 could focus on the program goals, the administrative 
policy, the timeline for deployment, and the vendor selection process. 
F. Execute Phased Roll-Out/Implementation 
The Checklist highlights several key developments in the last 
step, including the training of officers and continued messaging both 
internally and externally.115 The Checklist also recommends a phased-
in deployment rather than agency-wide rollout because the staggered 
approach is more measured and allows for flexibility should 
adjustments be needed. 116  The Checklist highlights post-
implementation assessments of BWC operations and outcomes, as 
well as “periodic reviews of policy and training.”117 
III.  POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND REVIEW 
The Checklist is grounded in a robust body of research that, over 
a period of forty years, has consistently highlighted administrative 
 
 107. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 2–3. 
 108. Id. at 3. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id.; BJA FAQs, supra note 93, at 31–32. 
 113. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 1; BJA FAQs, supra note 93, 
at 32, 40. 
 114. BJA FAQs, supra note 93, at 32. 
 115. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 36, at 3. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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rulemaking (i.e., policy) as the most effective method for guiding 
police officer behavior. 118  Administrative policy communicates to 
officers what the department considers acceptable, as well as what is 
prohibited. 119  Police officer behavior can therefore be directly 
influenced by administrative policy that is clear and widely 
enforced. 120  Several organizations, including the IACP, the 
Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies 
(“CALEA”), and the American Bar Association, have maintained 
the importance of thoughtful, written directives as an effective 
manner in which to guide police discretion.121 
The discretion-control value of administrative policy on a wide 
range of officer street behaviors has been reinforced consistently by 
results of empirical research. For example, some research shows that 
the enforcement of restrictive administrative policies can lead to 
lower levels of deadly force.122 Permissive or unenforced policies, in 
contrast, have been linked to higher rates of officer-involved 
shootings.123 These results led historian and criminologist Samuel 
Walker to conclude that “administrative rules have successfully 
limited police shooting discretion, with positive results in terms of 
 
 118. See SAMUEL WALKER & CHARLES M. KATZ, THE POLICE IN AMERICA: AN 
INTRODUCTION 388–97 (9th ed. 2018); Gerald M. Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by 
Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 500, 500–02 (1971). 
 119. WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 5, at 132 (citing VICTOR E. KAPPELER, 
RICHARD D. SLUDER & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, FORCES OF DEVIANCE: 
UNDERSTANDING THE DARK SIDE OF POLICING 218 (1998)).  
 120. Id.  
 121. See id.; STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: URBAN POLICE FUNCTION §	1-4.3 
(AM. BAR ASS’N, 2d ed. 1980) (explaining that administrative rulemaking is essential to 
the uniform control of police discretion); W. DWAYNE ORRICK, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS 
OF POLICE, DEVELOPING A POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY-PROCEDURE MANUAL 2, 
http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/BP-PolicyProcedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFP9-
HHFX] (explaining that a police department policy-procedure manual must include 
“[w]ritten directives related to policy, procedures, rules and regulations”); The 
Commission, CALEA (2010), http://www.calea.org/content/commission [https://perma.cc
/34FF-P8AB] (explaining that CALEA accreditation “require[s] an agency to develop a 
comprehensive, well thought out, uniform set of written directives” because it represents 
“one of the most successful methods for reaching administrative and operational goals, 
while also providing direction to personnel”).  
 122. WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 5, at 132 (citing James J. Fyfe, Police Use of 
Deadly Force: Research and Reform, 5 JUST. Q. 165, 199–201 (1988)); see also WILLIAM A. 
GELLER & MICHAEL S. SCOTT, DEADLY FORCE: WHAT WE KNOW 257 (1992) 
(explaining how empirical researchers have concluded that “departments with restrictive 
shooting policies experienced lower levels of shooting mb officers than departments with 
more permissive policies”). 
 123. GELLER & SCOTT, supra note 122, at 257; Michael D. White, Controlling Police 
Decisions to Use Deadly Force: Reexamining the Importance of Administrative Policy, 47 
CRIME & DELINQ. 131, 145 (2001). 
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social policy. Fewer people are being shot and killed, racial disparities 
in shootings have been reduced, and police officers are in no greater 
danger because of these restrictions.”124 Researchers have reported 
similar effects across other areas of policing, “including high-speed 
pursuits, use of police dogs, foot pursuits, and responses to domestic 
violence incidents.”125 
Given the relative novelty of police BWCs, there is scant 
empirical research documenting the effect of BWC policy on officers’ 
use of the technology.126 As a result, the US DOJ, through the BJA, 
has developed a BWC administrative policy review process to provide 
guidance to law enforcement agencies in this critically important 
area.127 The policy review process, developed by the national TTA 
team, is grounded in the robust body of evidence documenting the 
effectiveness of administrative policy in other aspects of police field 
behavior (e.g., use of force, auto pursuits), as well as the best 
available evidence on police BWCs.128 The BJT Scorecard forms the 
centerpiece of the policy review process. Evaluators use the BJA 
Scorecard to rate the overall comprehensive of a proposed BWC 
policy across eleven general policy areas, encompassing forty-one 
specific dimensions.129 The eleven policy areas are summarized in 
Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 124. SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950–1990, at 32 (1992).  
 125. WHITE & FRADELLA, supra note 5, at 134 (citing SAMUEL WALKER & CAROL A. 
ARCHBOLD, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 84 (2d ed. 2014)); 
MICHAEL D. WHITE, CURRENT ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES IN POLICING 276–78 
(2007); see also GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, POLICE PURSUIT: POLICIES AND TRAINING 4 
(1997), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/164831.pdf [https://perma.cc/BN2P-KYVV] (noting 
how more restrictive police pursuit policies drastically decreased the number of pursuits); 
MERRICK J. BOBB & STAFF, THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT: 12TH 
SEMIANNUAL REPORT 40–42 (2000), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-
CA-0001-0012.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM3F-ZAM6] (noting that strict enforcement of 
canine policies led to fewer dog bites). 
 126. For an exception, see STOKES & RANKIN, supra note 24, at 7. 
 127. See Body-Worn Camera Policy Review Scorecard, supra note 40. 
 128. See id.; POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN 
CAMERA PROGRAM 37, 48–49 (2014), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free
_Online_Documents/Technology/implementing%20a%20body-worn%20camera
%20program.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6Q7-KEP6]; WHITE, supra note 2, at 8–10. 
 129. Body-Worn Camera Policy Review Scorecard, supra note 40. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1579 (2018) 
2018] LAW, POLICY & BODY CAMERAS 1599 
 
Policy Development 
General Issues 
Video Capture – Activation 
Video Capture – Deactivation 
Data Transfer/Download 
Data Storage/Retention 
BWC Viewing 
BWC Training 
Public Release 
Policy and Program Evaluation 
BWCs and Use of Force 
 
Table 1: Policy Areas on The BJA Scorecard for BWCs 
 
Each of the forty-one items embedded in the eleven areas listed 
in Table 1 is scored as a “0” or a “1” on the BJA Scorecard, based on 
whether the issue is addressed in the policy; thus, a score of forty-one 
out of forty-one points represents a perfect score. Seventeen items on 
the BJA Scorecard are in red text, indicating that they are of critical 
importance and should be mandatory in a BWC policy.130 The BJA 
Scorecard therefore allows an agency to examine its policy 
performance in each of the eleven areas via subtotal scores, as well as 
its overall performance. 
Law enforcement agencies that receive federal funding through 
BJA’s Body-Worn Camera Policy and Implementation Program 
 
 130. Id. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1579 (2018) 
1600 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
(“PIP”) go through a mandatory policy review process at the start of 
their grant period.131 The agency can access ten percent of their grant 
funds immediately upon notification of the award, but the agency 
cannot access the remaining ninety percent until it passes the policy 
review process.132 Staff from the grantee agency work with TTA team 
members to score the policy on the BWC policy scorecard. This is 
typically an iterative, collaborative process that can take several 
weeks or even months. To pass the policy review process and access 
the remainder of their grant funds, the agency must score at least an 
eighty percent overall on the BJA Scorecard (thirty-three or higher 
out of forty-one possible points), as well as a perfect sub-score of 
seventeen out of seventeen points for the mandatory items.133 
It is important to note that the BJA Scorecard rates 
comprehensiveness only. Put differently, the BJA Scorecard assesses 
whether an issue is addressed in policy or not. The BJA Scorecard is 
not prescriptive or directional in terms of actual policy language. For 
example, one controversial issue addressed in Part IV is citizen 
notification: should officers advise citizens that they are being 
recorded on a BWC? 134  The BJA Scorecard item on citizen 
notification states, “Does the policy provide guidance on citizen 
notification of BWC?” If the policy provides guidance, the item is 
scored a “1” regardless of the exact nature of that guidance. The 
policy could mandate that officers notify citizens of the BWC (e.g., 
officers shall notify). The policy could recommend (but not require) 
that officers notify citizens of the BWC, or it could simply advise 
officers they are not required to notify citizens of the BWC. All three 
of these very different policy positions would receive a score of “1” 
for the citizen notification item. The US DOJ and the TTA team 
believe that specific decisions on key policy issues should be made at 
the local level between the law enforcement agency and all relevant 
stakeholders, rather than be prescribed by the federal government. 
The BJA Scorecard is publicly available as a tool to assist 
agencies in developing comprehensive BWC policies. Moreover, 
 
 131. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BODY-WORN 
CAMERA POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FY 2017 COMPETITIVE GRANT 
ANNOUNCEMENT 10–11 (2016), https://www.bja.gov/funding/BWCPIP17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/74BF-XME5]. 
 132. Id. at 6. 
 133. MICHAEL D. WHITE, JESSICA HERBERT & CHARLES M. KATZ, KEY TRENDS IN 
BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY AND PRACTICE 5 (2016), http://bwctta.com/sites/default
/files/Files/Resources/BWC%20Policy%20Analysis%20Final%2011-16_0.pdf [https://perma.cc
/CTV6-DM52]. 
 134. See infra Section IV.B. 
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agencies looking for guidance on specific policy issues can draw on 
the dozens of agency policies available on the Toolkit,135 as well as 
model policies from police leadership organizations136 and advocacy 
groups.137 
IV.  DIFFICULT POLICY POSITIONS 
Although the BJA Scorecard provides a model for developing a 
comprehensive BWC policy, local decisions on specific policy issues 
can be quite complicated, and, if poorly thought out, can short circuit 
the benefits of the technology. Many legal, operational, and policy 
concerns relevant to BWCs have been raised by scholars, 
practitioners, and commentators in a variety of forums, including 
peer-reviewed journal articles, 138  research reports, 139  law review 
articles,140 articles and editorials in newspapers141 and magazines,142 
 
 135. See Policy, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE: BODY-WORN CAMERA TOOLKIT, 
https://www.bja.gov/bwc/topics-policy.html [https://perma.cc/R7NP-EMBE]. 
 136. E.g., INT’L ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 17, at 1–2; POLICE EXEC. 
RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 128, at 53–66. 
 137. E.g., A Model Act for Regulating the Use of Wearable Body Cameras by Law 
Enforcement, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/model-act-regulating-use-wearable-
body-cameras-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/9C7G-R5AJ]. 
 138. See, e.g., Barak Ariel et al., “Contagious Accountability”: A Global Multisite 
Randomized Controlled Trial on the Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Citizens’ 
Complaints Against the Police, 44 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 293, 295 (2017) (noting how 
non-camera officers’ decision-making may be affected the presence of cameras on their 
co-workers); Ariel et al., supra note 29, at 750 (explaining that cameras may affect officer 
reporting of assaults against them); Ready & Young, supra note 71 (describing how officer 
discretion may be affected differentially, in that some forms of activity may increase (self-
initiated) while others decrease (arrests)). 
 139. See, e.g., KATZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 40–41; CYNTHIA LUM, CHRISTOPHER 
KOPER, LINDA MEROLA, AMBER SCHERER & AMANDA REIOUX, EXISTING AND 
ONGOING BODY WORN CAMERA RESEARCH: KNOWLEDGE GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
19–20 (2015), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/Phase-I-Report-Nov-
28-2015-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/37Y8-F9QM]; POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, 
supra note 128, at 1–3; STANLEY, supra note 18, at 2; WHITE, supra note 2, at 27–34. 
 140. See, e.g., Developments in the Law––Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1800–17 
(2015); Richard Lin, Note, Police Body Worn Cameras and Privacy: Retaining Benefits 
While Reducing Public Concerns, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 346, 349–57 (2016). 
 141. See, e.g., Mark Bowes, Police Body Camera Video Strains Chesterfield County 
Prosecutor, ROANOKE TIMES (Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.roanoke.com/news/virginia
/police-body-camera-video-strains-chesterfield-county-prosecutor/article_acee6e5c-738b-
54f6-a9f3-6f6d6ec29be3.html [https://perma.cc/ZT42-NPMV]; Chris Dunn & Donna 
Lieberman, Body Cameras Are Key for Police Accountability: We Can’t Let Them Erode 
Privacy Rights, WASH. POST. (June 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/posteverything/wp/2017/06/01/bodycams-are-key-for-police-accountability-we-cant-let-them
-erode-privacy-rights/?utm_term=.80527c3d43d4 [https://perma.cc/FR8Z-D78W (dark 
archive)]; Mitch Smith, Minneapolis Police Change Body Camera Policy After Fatal 
Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/us/minneapolis-
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blogs,143 and even podcasts.144 This Article does not rehash all of these 
debates. Rather, it highlights four overarching questions that have 
generated significant controversy among practitioners, researchers, 
and advocacy groups, each of which subsumes several distinct, but 
related, issues: (1) when should officers record their interactions with 
the public (i.e., activation)?; (2) what are the implications of an 
officer’s decision to notify, or his failure to notify, the citizen of the 
BWC?; (3) what might be the intended and unintended effects of 
officer review of BWC footage, especially after a critical incident, 
such as an officer-involved shooting?; and (4) when should 
supervisors review the BWC footage of their subordinate officers? 
A. Policy Issue 1: When Should Officers Record Their Interactions 
with the Public? 
In many U.S. jurisdictions, law enforcement officials need to be 
careful about running afoul of laws governing the recording of 
communications and other laws intended to safeguard citizens’ 
privacy. As part of the examination of these issues, we begin by 
summarizing fundamental concepts of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment. We then examine specific statutory and constitutional 
principles that might apply to police use of BWCs. 
1.  Primer on Privacy 
a. The Property Rights Approach 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of people “to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
 
police-body-camera-policy-fatal-shooting.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/YF2V-TYNJ 
(dark archive)]. 
 142. See, e.g., Robinson Meyer, Seen It All Before: 10 Predictions About Police Body 
Cameras, ATLANTIC (Dec. 5, 2014); https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014
/12/seen-it-all-before-10-predictions-about-police-body-cameras/383456/ [https://perma.cc
/5ZWM-57J6]; Janet Vertesi, The Problem with Police Body Cameras, TIME (May 4, 
2015), http://time.com/3843157/the-problem-with-police-body-cameras/ [https://perma.cc
/7LT9-3ZHJ]. 
 143. See, e.g., John V. Berry, Legal Issues for Police Officers with Body-Worn Cameras, 
POLICE L. BLOG (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.policelawblog.com/blog/body-worn-cameras/ 
[https://perma.cc/YP6H-8PKE]; Alex Sutherland & Barak Ariel, How Police Body 
Cameras Can Improve Behavior, Ease Tension, RAND BLOG (Nov. 2, 2016), 
https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/11/how-police-body-cameras-can-improve-behavior-ease-
tension.html [https://perma.cc/3D2G-XFTA]. 
 144. The BJA now has its own “BWC Podcast Series,” which can be downloaded 
online. See BWC Podcast Series, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, https://www.bja.gov
/Publications/podcasts/podcast.html [https://perma.cc/9Y8Q-PQF]. 
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unreasonable searches and seizures.”145 Because the express language 
of the Fourth Amendment stresses the importance of both personal 
and real property rights,146 “it is unsurprising that the U.S. Supreme 
Court initially grounded Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in a 
property-rights framework.” 147  As Olmstead v. United States 148 
illustrates, this approach relies on the premise that a “search,” for the 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, occurs when governmental 
actors physically trespass upon a constitutionally protected area.149  
 Yet what the Court considers to be a physical intrusion is not 
always intuitive. For example, in Olmstead, the evidence used to 
convict the defendants of conspiracy to violate the National 
Prohibition Act was obtained through wiretaps of the defendants’ 
home telephones and their principle place of business.150 The Court 
ruled that neither a search nor a seizure had occurred under the 
Fourth Amendment because “[t]here was no entry of the houses or 
offices of the defendants”––i.e., because the wiretaps were installed 
without physically trespassing on the defendants’ property. 151 
Similarly, in Goldman v. United States,152 the Court again relied on 
the lack of physical intrusion, finding that the placement of a listening 
device against a wall adjoining the defendant’s office did not 
constitute an illegal search or seizure.153 
On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly affirmed that 
“[w]hen the Government physically invades personal property to 
gather information, a search occurs.”154 For example, in Florida v. 
Jardines,155 the Court concluded that an unlawful search had occurred 
when police walked their drug-sniffing dog onto the defendant’s 
porch without a warrant, emphasizing that “the detectives had all 
four of their feet and all four of their companion's firmly planted on 
the constitutionally protected extension of [the defendant’s] 
 
 145. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 146. See id. See generally BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA 
CARTA TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2001) (discussing the importance of 
historical views on modern property rights). 
 147. Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Henry F. Fradella & Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy 
Require Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 
23 (2016). 
 148. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 149. Id. at 466. 
 150. Id. at 456–57. 
 151. Id. at 464. 
 152. 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
 153. Id. at 135–36. 
 154. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 155. 569 U.S. 1 (2013). 
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home.”156 The Court came to a similar result in Silverman v. United 
States.157 There, the unconstitutional physical intrusion occurred when 
law enforcement officers pushed a “spike mike” through a common 
wall until it hit a heating duct in the defendant’s home.158 Even 
though the invasion was minimal, the Court found that the Fourth 
Amendment had been violated based on the fact that the microphone 
physically invaded the defendant’s premises.159 
b. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Approach 
In Katz v. United States,160 the Supreme Court expanded Fourth 
Amendment protections to encompass situations in which 
governmental agents infringe upon someone’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy even when there is no physical trespass to property.161 Katz 
involved a challenge to the FBI’s warrantless electronic surveillance 
of the defendant in a public telephone booth as a part of an 
investigation into illegal gambling. 162  In agreeing that the FBI’s 
activities “constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment,” the Court was careful to emphasize that the 
Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places.”163 Thus, “[t]he fact 
that the electronic device . . . did not happen to penetrate the wall of 
the booth can have no constitutional significance”—even though the 
recording device was used in a public place, its use “violated the 
privacy upon which [the defendant] justifiably relied” while in the 
phone booth.”164 Accordingly, the Katz “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test, articulated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence and now 
considered to form the basis of the Court’s subsequent approach to 
Fourth Amendment searches, states, “there is a twofold requirement, 
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”165 
Since Katz, courts have consistently relied on Justice Harlan’s 
two-step test when analyzing Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
 
 156. Id. at 8. 
 157. 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
 158. Id. at 506. 
 159. Id. at 509–11. 
 160. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 161. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Scott-Hayward et al., supra note 147, at 
25. 
 162. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (majority opinion).  
 163. Id. at 351, 353. 
 164. Id. at 353. 
 165. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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claims, 166  “despite the difficulty inherent in ascertaining when a 
subjective expectation of privacy is ‘reasonable.’”167 And while the 
Court has not completely abandoned the Olmstead property-based 
approach, it has nonetheless made clear that the Katz approach 
should apply in all cases not involving physical trespass.168 
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy approach to the Fourth 
Amendment has particular relevance to law enforcement use of 
recording devices. For example, in United States v. Paxton,169 the 
Seventh Circuit considered whether arrestees harbored a reasonable 
expectation of privacy with regard to conversations held while they 
were detained in a police van.170  In finding that no objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy existed, the court emphasized that 
“[p]olice surveillance equipment (including both dashboard cameras 
and body cameras) has become both cheaper and more effective” and 
thus, “one wonders how much of a reminder a detainee needs that he 
might be under surveillance—particularly in a marked police 
vehicle.”171 
2.  Consent to Record 
In addition to the Fourth Amendment, federal and state 
statutory laws affect any person’s ability to record telephone and in-
person conversations. Because BWCs involve the latter, it is 
imperative that all BWC policies comply with statutes governing the 
recording of conversations. 
To deter improper surveillance by a third party, both federal law 
and state-level provisions in forty-nine states require that at least one 
 
 166. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739–41 (1979) (explaining Katz by 
referring to Justice Harlan’s two step approach). 
 167. Scott-Hayward et al., supra note 147, at 25. 
 168. See id. (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)). For example, in United 
States v. Lambus, 251 F. Supp. 3d 470 (E.D.N.Y. 2017), the court granted a motion to 
suppress GPS tracking data, reasoning, 
A tracking device search does not end at the moment of physical trespass by 
installation. Whether conceptualized as one continuous search, or two 
discrete searches .	.	. , the use of the tracking device to actually monitor the 
location of a person or object is a separate search from installation for 
Fourth Amendment purposes	.	.	. . Even if the initial search occasioned by 
the installation of the device is governed by a limited trespass doctrine, the 
search occasioned by the use of the device to transmit precise location 
information is controlled by the broader Katz reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test.  
Id. at 495. 
 169. 848 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 170. Id. at 806. 
 171. Id. at 812–13. 
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party to a conversation consent to any recording of that 
conversation.172 For example, in the year following the decision in 
Katz, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968.173 A major effect of this legislation, provided in Title III, 
was to supersede prior prohibitions on electronic surveillance with a 
new, limited authorization to use these techniques subject to a 
warrant requirement. 174  Sometimes referred to as the federal 
wiretapping laws, Title III generally prohibits the surreptitious 
interception (recording) of “any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication.” 175  Title III, its state law counterparts, and the 
privacy guarantees of the Fourth Amendment are generally aimed at 
curtailing governmental intrusions—especially those concerning 
criminal investigations.176 But these laws are also concerned with 
protecting people’s privacy—even from eavesdropping under 
circumstances in which a reasonable person would not have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the conversation.177 Under such 
circumstances, at least one party to a conversation must generally 
consent to it being recorded.178 
 
 172. See Carol M. Bast, Conflict of Law and Surreptitious Taping of Telephone 
Conversations, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 147, 149–50 (2010). 
 173. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 
197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§	2510–2522 (2012) and 42 U.S.C. §	3711 (2012)). 
 174. JOHN N. FERDICO, HENRY F. FRADELLA & CHRISTOPHER D. TOTTEN, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONAL 181–82 (12th ed. 
2016). The Act has been amended numerous times, including, inter alia, by the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (2012)); Communications Assistance to Law 
Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103–414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (2012)); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214, (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
U.S.C. (2012)); USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (2012)); USA PATRIOT Act Additional 
Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–178, 120 Stat. 278 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (2012)); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–261 (2008), 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. (2012)); FISA Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, 
Pub. L. No. 112–3, 125 Stat. 5; and PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. 112–
14, 125 Stat. 216. 
 175. 18 U.S.C. §	2511(1)(a) (2012); see also §§	2510–2522. 
 176. See FERDICO ET AL., supra note 174, at 174–202 (detailing the “series of judicially 
created and statutory rules governing high-tech searches and surveillance”). 
 177. See Carol M. Bast, What’s Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of the 
Law of Eavesdropping, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 837, 906 (1998); Michael J. Gibson, 
Comment, Just Because It’s Legal Doesn’t Mean You Can Do It: The Legality of Employee 
Eavesdropping and Illinois Workplace Recording Policies, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 913, 917–
19 (2015). 
 178. Bast, supra note 172, at 150–51. 
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a. Eavesdropping When There Is No Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy 
As a general rule, when a conversation occurs in a public place 
where third parties can overhear it, there is no reasonable expectation 
of privacy as a matter of law.179 Consider, for example, that the Fifth 
Circuit in Kee v. City of Rowlett180 upheld the use of recordings of 
conversations and prayers made at a graveside burial service because 
the public nature of the outdoor conversations rendered them beyond 
the scope of any reasonable expectation of privacy.181 Courts have 
similarly upheld the use of non-privileged recordings made in 
correctional facilities182 and inside police vehicles on the basis that the 
participants in the conversation lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy under the circumstances.183 And because, under federal law, 
telephones themselves are not considered intercepting devices when 
they are used at home or in offices as part of the ordinary course of 
business,184 what family members overhear while eavesdropping on 
the conversations of other family members using an extension 
telephone185 and what employers overhear while monitoring phone 
conversations over extensions for legitimate business reasons also do 
not implicate Title III.186 
b. One-Party Consent 
Under the so-called “one-party consent” approach, so long as 
one person involved in a conversation is aware of the fact that the 
 
 179. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (“What a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967))); Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[C]onversations in the 
open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under 
the circumstances would be unreasonable.”); see also FERDICO ET AL., supra note 174, at 
191. 
 180. 247 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 181. Id. at 215–18. 
 182. See United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1169–70 (5th Cir. 1985) (“It is 
unnecessary to consult the case law to conclude that one who expects privacy under the 
circumstances of prison visiting is, if not actually foolish, exceptionally naïve.”); see also 
MICH. COMP. LAWS §	750.539g(d) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 2018, No. 10 of the 2018 
Reg. Sess., 99th Leg.). 
 183. See United States v. Paxton, 848 F.3d 803, 813 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. 
Dunbar, 553 F.3d 48, 57 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Turner, 209 F.3d 1198, 1201 (10th 
Cir. 2000); United States v. McKinnon, 985 F.2d 525, 527–28 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 184. 18 U.S.C. §	2510(5)(a) (2012). 
 185. FERDICO ET AL., supra note 174, at 191 (citing Commonwealth v. Vieux, 671 
N.E.2d 989 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996)). 
 186. Id. (citing O’Sullivan v. NYNEX Corp., 687 N.E.2d 1241 (Mass. 1997)). 
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conversation is being recorded, then his or her consent to such 
recording satisfies the requirement of both Title III as well as its state 
law counterparts in roughly four-fifths of states.187 
Thus, a law enforcement officer or a private citizen who is a 
party to a communication may intercept the communication or 
permit a law enforcement official to intercept the 
communication without violating Title III or the Fourth 
Amendment. This [one-party consent doctrine] allows a law 
enforcement officer or agent, an informant, an accomplice or 
co-conspirator, or a victim to wear a body microphone; act as an 
undercover agent without being wired; or eavesdrop or record a 
telephone conversation with the permission of the person 
receiving the call even though the person making the call has no 
knowledge of this activity. A private citizen, however, may not 
intercept a communication “for the purpose of committing any 
criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws 
of the United States or of any State.”188 
c. All-Party Consent 
As of March 2018, fifteen states provide more privacy 
protections than Title III, and the one-party consent approach is used 
in the remaining U.S. jurisdictions. The laws in these states generally 
fall into one of two categories: complete all-party consent or partial 
all-party consent. 
First, there are eleven states that provide a high level of privacy 
for their residents with regard to the recording of communications by 
private persons. These states include California, 189  Delaware, 190 
Florida, 191  Georgia, 192  Illinois, 193  Maryland, 194  Massachusetts, 195 
 
 187. Id.; Gibson, supra note 177, at 917–19. 
 188. FERDICO ET AL., supra note 174, at 191–92 (citation omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§	2511(2)(d)). 
 189. CAL. PENAL CODE §	632(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 190. DEL. CODE ANN. §	1335(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through 81 Laws 2017). 
 191. FLA. STAT. ANN. §	934.03(2)(d) (West, Westlaw current through 2017 First Reg. 
Sess. & Special “A” Sess. of the 25th Legislature). State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 
1985), carved out a narrow exception to Florida’s all-party consent law in a case in which 
the victim of a murder had illegally recorded conversations with his murderer. Id. at 1274. 
Although the concurrence argued that the statutory language at issue made it clear that 
the audio recording should have been suppressed from evidence, id. at 1277 (Erlich, J., 
concurring) (“It is this Court’s tortuous misconstruction of the plain language of the 
statute which requires the indefensible rationale of the majority opinion.”), the Supreme 
Court of Florida took a seemingly results-oriented approach when it concluded that the 
eavesdropping law did not apply in the case. The majority reasoned that the defendant 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversation with the deceased victim 
regarding a business deal in light of “the quasi-public nature of the premises within which 
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Montana,196 New Hampshire,197 Pennsylvania,198 and Washington.199 
Whenever there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, these states 
prohibit the recording of most conversations between private 
 
the conversations occurred, the physical proximity and accessibility of the premises to 
bystanders, and the location and visibility to the unaided eye of the microphone used to 
record the conversations.” Id. at 1274. Inciarrano has been followed in cases that mirror 
the unusual facts of the case, such as when a recording is made in a place of business using 
recording equipment that is visible. E.g., State v. Caraballo, 198 So. 3d 819, 822 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2016) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy when “conversion occurred 
at a [public] sales counter	.	.	. and the business was open to the public at the time the 
recording was made”). Otherwise, Florida cases have generally limited Inciarrano by 
distinguishing its somewhat unique circumstances from other recordings made by victims 
of crime. E.g., McDade v. State, 154 So. 3d 292, 298 (Fla. 2014) (“Because of the 
differences in the location, visibility of the recording device, and content of the recordings 
at issue in Inciarrano, it presented a set of circumstances that are starkly different from 
those present here.”); Abdo v. State, 144 So. 3d 594, 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (finding 
insufficient evidence that the defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in 
moving car when it remained unclear “how many people were in the vehicle, whether [the 
defendant] was aware of the recording, who recorded the video, and what was said on the 
recording”). 
 192. GA. CODE ANN. §	16-11-62(2) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 193. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §	5/14-2(a) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100-576 of 
2018 Reg. Sess.). People v. Beardsley, 503 N.E.2d 346 (Ill. 1986), reversed an 
eavesdropping conviction of a defendant who, while in custody in the back seat of a police 
vehicle, recorded the conversation of the two officers sitting in the front seat. Id. at 350. 
Importantly, the officers knew the defendant had a tape recorder and allowed him to 
maintain possession of it while in the patrol car. Id. Because the officers knew their 
conversation was not private, the defendant’s recording of that conversation was held not 
to violate the eavesdropping statute. Id. After the Beardsley decision, the Illinois 
legislature felt it necessary to clarify, via statutory amendment, “that no recording could 
be made absent consent from all parties regardless of any lack of expectation of privacy. 
Thus, the statute now essentially deems all conversations to be private and not subject to 
recording even if the participants themselves have no expectation of privacy.” People v. 
Clark, 6 N.E.3d 154, 160 (Ill. 2014) (emphasis added). 
 194. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §	10-402(c)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2017 
Reg. Sess.). 
 195. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, §	99(B)(4), (C)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 
175 of 2017 1st Ann. Sess.). 
 196. MONT. CODE ANN. §	45-8-213(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 197. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §	570-A:2(I)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 198. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §	5704(4) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. 
Sess.). 
 199. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §	9.73.030(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 3d Spec. 
Sess.). Washington prohibits the interception or recording of “private conversation[s].” Id. 
To determine whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy that triggers this 
eavesdropping law, courts are to consider the “(1) duration and subject matter of the 
conversation, (2) location of conversation and presence or potential presence of a third 
party, and (3) role of the non-consenting party and his or her relationship to the 
consenting party.” Lewis v. Dep’t of Licensing, 139 P.3d 1078, 1083 (Wash. 2006). The 
court in Lewis held that “traffic stop conversations are not private[;]” yet, the Washington 
statute nonetheless requires law enforcement officers to notify drivers that they are being 
recorded during a traffic stop. Id. at 1086. 
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persons—including in-person, by telephone, or via any electronic or 
computer-based communication system—without the permission of 
all the parties. Massachusetts courts have gone even further than most 
states by requiring consent from all parties to record in-person 
conversations that occur in public locations.200 
Second, another four states require all-party consent for some 
types of communications, but only one-party consent for others. 
Connecticut, for example, applies all-party consent to telephone 
conversations,201 but one-party consent to the recording of in-person 
communications. 202  Similarly, unless there is some emergency 
situation that is later ratified by a court, Nevada typically requires all-
party consent to record telephone conversations,203 but only requires 
one-party consent to record in-person conversations.204 Conversely, 
Oregon utilizes the one-party consent for telephone and other forms 
of wire communications, but requires all-party consent to record an 
in-person conversation.205 
Unlike Connecticut, Nevada, and Oregon, Michigan does not 
differentiate between in-person, telephone, and electronic 
communications. Rather, its rules vary depending on who is doing the 
recording. At first blush, Michigan appears to be an all-party consent 
state because its eavesdropping law applies to the recording of “any 
part of the private discourse of others without the permission of all” 
parties to the conversation.206 Michigan law also provides that “[a]ny 
person who is present or who is not present during a private 
conversation and who willfully uses any device to eavesdrop upon the 
conversation without the consent of all parties thereto” is guilty of a 
felony.207 A 1982 decision from the Michigan Court of Appeals, 
 
 200. Commonwealth v. Manzelli, 864 N.E.2d 566, 568 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) 
(upholding conviction of a protestor for secretly audio-taping a conversation with police 
officer that occurred in public at a political rally). 
 201. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §	52-570d(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 June Special 
Sess.). 
 202. Id. §§	53a-187, -189 (Westlaw). 
 203. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §	200.620 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.); see 
also Lane v. Allstate Ins. Co., 969 P.2d 938, 940–41 (Nev. 1998) (finding that §	200.620 
requires all-party consent to record private telephone conversations). But see State v. 
Reyes, 808 P.2d 544, 547–48 (Nev. 1991) (holding that acquisition of telephone 
communications, via listening on a telephone extension, by a law enforcement officer in 
the ordinary course of his duties was not an “interception” for the purposes of the 
eavesdropping statute). 
 204. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §	200.650. 
 205. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §	165.540(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 206. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §	750.539a (West, Westlaw through P.A.2018, No. 37 of 
the 2018 Reg. Sess., 99th Legis.) (emphasis added). 
 207. Id. §	750.539c (Westlaw) (emphasis added). 
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however, concluded that a participant of the conversation may record 
that conversation without the consent of other participants, thereby 
effectively limiting the state’s all-party consent statute to third-party 
recording of communications.208 
d. Criminal Justice Exceptions to All-Party Consent 
Even those jurisdictions that have strict all-party recording laws 
make some criminal justice exceptions. For example, although 
California, Illinois, and Washington are all-party consent 
jurisdictions, all three states permit the recording of a conversation 
with the consent of one party if certain criminal activity is involved.209 
Connecticut provides comparable exceptions to its usual rules of all-
party consent to record telephone calls.210 Similarly, although Oregon 
requires all-party consent for the recording of in-person 
communications, the state dispenses with the requirement if the 
conversation involves “a felony that endangers human life.”211 
Moreover, as Professor Carol Bast noted, “Private parties are 
treated much differently than law enforcement officers or informants 
in the states requiring all-party consent.” 212  Indeed, as Table 2 
illustrates, each of the jurisdictions that typically require all-party 
consent for the recording of certain types of conversations provide 
some statutory exceptions to those requirements for law enforcement 
officers in the course of conducting criminal investigations. 
 
 
 208. Sullivan v Gray, 324 N.W.2d 58, 60–61 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); see also Dickerson 
v. Raphael, 564 N.W.2d 85, 88–90 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that Michigan statute 
prevents “third parties from recording covertly, while it occurs, a private conversation in 
which they are not participants and then rebroadcasting that conversation”); cf. Williams 
v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (declining to allow a parent to 
consent on behalf of a minor child). 
 209. See CAL. PENAL CODE §	633.5 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) 
(“[California’s wiretapping laws] do not prohibit one party to a confidential 
communication from recording the communication for the purpose of obtaining evidence 
reasonably believed to relate to the commission by another party to the communication of 
the crime of extortion, kidnapping, bribery, any felony involving violence against the 
person.”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §	5/14-3(g)–(i) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100-
576 of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (listing a range of criminal justice exceptions to all-party consent 
requirement); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §	9.73.030(2) (West, Westlaw through 2017 3d 
Spec. Sess.) (providing exception for conversations that “convey threats of extortion, 
blackmail, bodily harm, or other unlawful requests or demands,” hostage-related 
situations, and calls that occur “anonymously or repeatedly or at an extremely 
inconvenient hour”). 
 210. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §	52-570d(b)(3)–(4) (West, Westlaw through 2017 June 
Spec. Sess.). 
 211. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §	165.540(5)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
 212. Bast, supra note 177, at 869. 
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State Law Enforcement Exemption 
California Cal. Penal Code § 633 permits law enforcement 
to record “any communication that they could 
lawfully overhear or record prior to the effective 
date of [the wiretapping and eavesdropping 
statutes].”  
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-570d(b)(1) permits law 
enforcement officers to record private telephonic 
conversations in the “lawful performance” of 
their official duties. 
Delaware Del. Code Ann. § 1335(b)(5) exempts police 
officers from all-party consent requirement. 
Florida Fla. Stat. § 934.03(2)(c) permits law enforcement 
officers “to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic 
communication when such person is a party to 
the communication or one of the parties to the 
communication has given prior consent to such 
interception and the purpose of such interception 
is to obtain evidence of a criminal act.” 
Georgia Ga. Code Ann. 16-11-62(2)(D) permits law 
enforcement officers and their agents to use 
devices in the lawful performance of official 
duties “to observe, photograph, videotape, or 
record the activities of persons that occur in the 
presence of such officer or his or her agent.” 
Illinois 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/14-3(g) exempts law 
enforcement from the all-party consent 
requirement when investigating specific criminal 
offenses (including forcible felonies) so long as 
prior notification was made “to the State's 
Attorney of the county in which [the recording] is 
to occur.”  
Maryland Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-402(c)(2)–
(6) exempt law enforcement officers from all-
party consent requirements when the officer is a 
party to a conversation; when recordings are 
made by an officer, informant, or cooperating 
witness during the investigation of a wide range 
of enumerated criminal offenses; when a 
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recording is made during a traffic stop with 
notice; and if there is reasonable cause to believe 
that a law enforcement officer’s safety may be in 
jeopardy during the course of a criminal 
investigation. 
Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4) 
exempts law enforcement officers from all-party 
consent requirement when recording or 
transmitting wire or oral communications “if the 
officer is a party to such communication” or if the 
officer has been granted permission by the party 
being recorded or transmitted during the course 
of an investigation of certain criminal offenses 
designated within the statute. Additionally, Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 99(D)(1)(e) permits 
recording performed by an undercover law 
enforcement officer. 
Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.539g specifically 
exempts “eavesdropping or surveillance not 
otherwise prohibited by law” by law enforcement 
officers in performance of official duties. 
Montana Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-213(1)(c)(i) exempts 
public officials and public employees if the 
recording is made in the performance of an 
official duty. Additionally, Mont. Code Ann. § 
45-8-213(1)(c)(iii) allows recording upon consent 
of one party if the other party is given notice of 
the recording. 
Nevada Upon petition by the state attorney general or 
the district attorney of any county, Nev. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 179.460 grants judges the authority 
to issue orders allowing law enforcement officers 
to record all types of communications relevant to 
the investigation of a wide range of enumerated 
criminal offenses. One-party consent may be 
sanctioned after the fact if seeking a court order 
is impracticable as a result of some emergency 
situation pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
200.620. Additionally, Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
179.463 exempts law enforcement officers from 
all-party consent when recording all types of 
communications relevant to hostage situations. 
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And because § 200.650 requires only one-party 
consent for a party to an in-person conversation 
to record it, courts have held that law 
enforcement may wire an informant and record 
the transmitted conversation. 
213 
New 
Hampshire 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 570-A:2(II)(c)–(h) not 
only allows law enforcement officers to wear 
wires that transmit communications while 
conducting certain types of investigations, but 
also allows them to record conversations 
concerning certain enumerated offenses. 
Oregon As previously mentioned, Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
165.540(5) allows both civilians and law 
enforcement personnel to record any 
conversation concerning a felony that endangers 
human life. That same statutory provision also 
allows law enforcement officers to record 
conversations in which they are a participant 
while performing official duties. 
Pennsylvania 18 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5704 permits, 
with the prior permission of the state attorney 
general or the relevant county prosecutor, law 
enforcement officers to record conversations 
relevant to suspected criminal activity in which 
the officer is a party to the conversation or, 
alternatively, at least one party to the 
conversation grants consent.  
Washington Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.73.090 exempts law 
enforcement officers from the all-party consent 
requirements if they are a party to the 
conversation and if prior approval for one-party 
consent to record a conversation is received from 
a judicial officer who “shall” approve the 
interception upon a showing of probable cause. 
Additionally, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.73.200 
provides, 
conversations regarding illegal drug 
operations should be intercepted, 
 
 213. See, e.g., Summers v. State, 718 P.2d 676, 680 (Nev. 1986). 
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transmitted, and recorded in certain 
circumstances without prior judicial 
approval in order to protect the life and 
safety of law enforcement personnel and to 
enhance prosecution of drug offenses, and 
that that interception and transmission can 
be done without violating the constitutional 
guarantees of privacy. 
Table 2: State Criminal Justice Exceptions to All-Party 
Consent as of March 2018. 
 
e. Specific Legislation Exempting BWCs from Wiretapping and 
Eavesdropping Laws 
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures,214 
six states—California, 215  Georgia, 216  Illinois, 217  Nevada, 218  New 
Hampshire,219 and Oregon220—statutorily exempted BWCs from their 
 
 214. See Body-Worn Camera Data and Eavesdropping Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGSISLATURES (Oct. 27, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/body-worn-cameras-interactive-graphic.aspx#/ [https://perma.cc/JW5T-V7A6]. 
 215. CAL PENAL CODE §	633.02 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“Nothing in 
Section 631, 632, 632.5, 632.6, or 632.7 shall prohibit any POST-certified chief of police, 
assistant chief of police, or police officer of a university or college campus from using or 
operating body-worn cameras.”). 
 216. GA. CODE ANN. §	16-11-62(2)(D) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“[I]t 
shall not be unlawful	.	.	. [f]or a law enforcement officer or his or her agent to use a device 
in the lawful performance of his or her official duties to observe, photograph, videotape, 
or record the activities of persons that occur in the presence of such officer or his or her 
agent.”). 
 217. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §	5/14-3(h)(5) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100-576 
of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (exempting “[r]ecordings of utterances made by a person while in the 
presence of a uniformed peace officer and while an occupant of a police vehicle including, 
but not limited to, (i) recordings made simultaneously with the use of an in-car video 
camera and (ii) recordings made in the presence of the peace officer utilizing video or 
audio systems, or both, authorized by the law enforcement agency”). 
 218. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §	179.425(3) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) 
(excluding use of “portable recording device, as defined [in other sections authoring police 
use of body-worn cameras]”). 
 219. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §	570-A:2(II)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) 
(“It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for	.	.	. [a]ny law enforcement officer, when 
conducting investigations of or making arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter, to 
carry on the person an electronic, mechanical or other device which intercepts oral 
communications and transmits such communications by radio.”); §	570-A:2(II)(j) (“It shall 
not be unlawful under this chapter for	.	.	. [a] uniformed law enforcement officer to make 
an audio recording in conjunction with a video recording of a routine stop performed in 
the ordinary course of patrol duties	.	.	. provided that the officer shall first give notification 
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state wiretapping and eavesdropping laws by April 1, 2017. Since that 
time, at least two more states enacted legislation exempting BWCs 
from their wiretapping and eavesdropping laws, including Maryland221 
and Pennsylvania.222 
f. Summary 
Law enforcement officers’ use of BWCs will not run afoul of 
Title III or the Fourth Amendment under most circumstances for 
three important reasons. First, the one-party consent approach to 
recording conversations means that a law enforcement officer’s 
knowledge that an encounter is being recorded satisfies the 
requirements of Title III and the overwhelming majority of its state 
law counterparts. 
Second, little of what transpires in public will engender a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, as is the case with closed-
circuit cameras that are generally used to record events in public 
areas such as commercial establishments, garages, parking lots, and 
the like,223 and dashboard cameras that only record what transpires 
outside, BWCs will rarely reach locations in which people have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. That being said, BWCs, unlike 
closed-circuit cameras or dashboard cameras, can also be used in 
many places in which people reasonably expect privacy, including in 
their homes. Thus, BWC use might run afoul of laws that prohibit 
recording conversations where a speaker expects privacy, such as 
when interviewing victims of certain crimes (especially sex crimes and 
 
of such recording to the party to the communication unless it is not reasonable or 
practicable under the circumstances.”). 
 220. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §	165.540(5)(d)(B) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. 
Sess.) (exempting a police officer “who is in uniform and displaying a badge and who is 
operating	.	.	. [a] video camera worn upon the officer’s person that records the officer’s 
interactions with members of the public while the officer is on duty”). 
 221. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §	10-402(c)(11)(ii) (West, Westlaw through 
2017 Reg. Sess.) (“It is lawful under this subtitle for a law enforcement officer in the 
course of the officer’s regular duty to intercept an oral communication with a body-worn 
digital recording device or an electronic control device capable of recording video and oral 
communications.”). 
 222. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §	5702 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. 
Sess.) (exempting any “communication made in the presence of a law enforcement officer 
on official duty who is in uniform or otherwise clearly identifiable as a law enforcement 
officer and who is using an electronic, mechanical or other [approved] device	.	.	. to 
intercept the communication in the course of law enforcement duties”). 
 223. See Robert D. Bickel, Susan Brinkley & Wendy White, Seeing Past Privacy: Will 
the Development and Application of CCTV and Other Video Security Technology 
Compromise an Essential Constitutional Right in a Democracy, or Will the Courts Strike a 
Proper Balance?, 33 STETSON L. REV. 299, 321–23 (2003). 
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domestic violence offenses), assisting people who are fully or partially 
unclothed, talking with people in schools or health care facilities, or 
speaking to a confidential informant.224 And, according to the Urban 
Institute, forty-one states have such laws.225 
Third, as previously explained, the eight states that usually 
require all-party consent to record conversations have specifically 
exempted BWCs from the reach of those statutes (California, 
Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, and 
Pennsylvania).226 Of the remaining all-party consent states, as Table 2 
illustrates, one (Connecticut) does not require all-party consent to 
record in-person conversations (only telephonic communications);227 
four other all-party consent states (Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Montana) already had provisions in their laws that carved-out 
expectations for law enforcement officers from the usual 
requirements for all-party consent to record conversations.228 Thus, as 
a matter of statutory law, all-party consent to record conversations on 
BWCs does not appear to be problematic in any state other than 
Washington.  
Case law in Washington, however, has established that 
conversations between people interacting with law enforcement 
officers acting in their official capacities are not “private” and, 
therefore, do not fall within the scope of the state’s usual all-party 
consent requirement.229 Relying on that case law, the Washington 
State Attorney General issued a formal opinion in 2014 specifically 
stating that the Washington Privacy Act does not require consent 
from a citizen to record a conversation with a law enforcement 
officer.230 
 
 224. See Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 
68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 399–402 (2016) (discussing the tension between the need for 
transparency and the protection of privacy); see also Thomas K. Bud, The Rise and Risk of 
Police Body-Worn Cameras in Canada, 14 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 117, 118–19 (2016) 
(questioning whether the presumed gains in police accountability attendant to BWCs are 
worth the tradeoffs to privacy). 
 225. Police Body-Worn Camera Legislation Tracker: State-by-State Breakdown, 
URBAN INST. (Jan. 2017), http://apps.urban.org/features/body-camera-update/ 
[https://perma.cc/7BBU-FWQ4]. 
 226. See supra notes 215–22 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra notes 191, 195–96, 206–07 and accompanying text. 
 229. See Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 683–85 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying Washington 
state law); Washington v. Flora, 845 P.2d 1355, 1357–58 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
 230. Law Enforcement—Privacy—Recording Conversations—Video & Audio 
Recording of Communications Between Citizens & Law Enforcement Officers Using 
Body Cameras Attached to Police Uniforms, Wash. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 8 (2014), 2014 WL 
6711950, at *1. 
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The legal requirements of all-party consent statutes 
notwithstanding, it may be good practice for law enforcement officers 
to notify people that BWCs are recording their interactions—even if 
such a notification is not required by law—because “the knowledge 
that cameras are running can help defuse potentially confrontational 
situations and improve behavior from all parties.”231  As will be 
explained later, however, this assumption currently lacks sufficient 
empirical support to amount to anything more than speculation. 
3.  BWC Activation in Practice: Results from Our Policy Analysis 
We conducted an analysis of 129 BWC policies of law 
enforcement agencies that have been funded through the US DOJ 
Body-Worn Camera Policy and Implementation Program. The 
analysis includes agencies funded in FY 2015 (n=54) and FY 2016 
(n=75), and all agencies had their policies approved via the policy 
review process we previously outlined.232  Our review of grantee 
policies uncovered a significant amount of variation in how 
departments address the activation issue, particularly regarding the 
degree of discretion departments give their officers as to when they 
turn on their BWC.233 We classified the degree of discretion permitted 
in activation on a three-level scale: mandatory (no discretion), 
discretionary, and restricted. 
All of the policies in our analysis describe encounters in which 
activation of the BWC is mandatory, though departments address this 
issue in different ways.234 Some policies provide a list of the types of 
encounters in which activation is required (e.g., pedestrian stops, 
searches of vehicles or residences), while others provide a general 
statement only (e.g., “Officers will activate the BWC to record all 
contacts with citizens in the performance of calls for service”).235 
Similarly, policies also identify circumstances in which activation is 
prohibited.236 For example, many of the policies we reviewed prohibit 
the recording of privileged conversations, such as those between an 
 
 231. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 128, at 14. 
 232. See supra notes 131–37 and accompanying text. For more detail on the policy 
analysis, see MICHAEL D. WHITE, MICHAELA FLIPPIN & CHARLES M. KATZ, KEY 
TRENDS IN BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY AND PRACTICE: A TWO-YEAR POLICY 
ANALYSIS OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE-FUNDED LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
7–8 (2017), http://bwctta.com/sites/default/files/Files/Resources/Policy%20Analysis
%20Year%202%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQ7L-EME3] 
 233. Id. at 8–10. 
 234. Id. at 9. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
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attorney and client.237 Approximately sixty percent of the policies 
allow officer discretion in activation if they find themselves in an 
encounter where neither the mandatory nor the prohibited criteria 
apply.238 Typical language in such policies states that officers may 
activate their BWCs whenever they feel their use would be beneficial 
to the performance of their official duties.239 
In sum, none of the policies in our analysis allow full officer 
discretion with activation. Rather, all policies provide certain 
parameters to guide officer decision-making. This finding 
demonstrates how police departments are employing administrative 
policy to guide officer decision-making on BWC activation (rather 
than leaving the decision solely to the officers). Moreover, most 
policies allow for discretionary activation under certain 
circumstances, indicating that many agencies recognize the 
importance of officer discretion in circumstances that do not meet the 
mandatory or prohibitory criteria for BWC activation. 
B. Policy Issue 2: Citizen Notification 
Research suggests that people behave differently when they 
know they are being observed. 240  Specifically, it appears that 
“knowing with sufficient certainty that our behavior is being observed 
or judged affects various social cognitive processes: We experience 
public self-awareness, become more prone to socially acceptable 
behavior, and sense a heightened need to cooperate with rules.”241 
For example, people who know they are being observed using 
security cameras increase “prosocial” behaviors, such as helping 
someone in need.242 Conversely, video monitoring also decreases 
 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See Tayna L. Chartrand & John A. Bargh, The Chameleon Effect: The Perception–
Behavior Link and Social Interaction, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 893, 893 
(1999) (explaining the “chameleon effect” in which people unconsciously mimic “the 
postures, mannerisms, facial expressions, and other behaviors” of the people with whom 
they are interacting in a social environment); see also Ethan Bernstein, How Being Filmed 
Changes Employee Behavior, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 12, 2014), http://blogs.hbr.org/2014
/09/how-being-filmed-changes-employee-behavior/ [https://perma.cc/TR2L-H53C] (“The 
most significant impact of bodycams, taxicams, and the like is not reliving the past but, 
rather, changing behavior in the present. We act differently when we know we’re on 
camera.”). 
 241. Ariel et al., supra note 138, at 297 (internal citations omitted). 
 242. Thomas J. L. van Rompay, Dorette J. Vonk & Marieke L. Fransen, The Eye of the 
Camera: Effects of Security Cameras on Prosocial Behavior, 41 ENV’T & BEHAV. 60, 63–64 
(2009). 
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undesirable behaviors, such as employee theft,243 vandalism on school 
busses,244 and the commission of certain types of crimes in public 
areas.245 Collectively, these “observer effect” findings suggest that 
being recorded can deter undesirable behaviors. 
This very premise underlies the purported usefulness of BWCs, 
insofar as they are expected to promote respectful encounters 
between police and the people with whom officers interact—
“resulting in fewer citizen complaints, less use of force by officers, and 
fewer assaults on officers.”246 But this premise amounts to little more 
than an untested assumption with regard to how BWCs actually affect 
behavior of officers and members of the public.247 At least two major 
studies are currently underway which endeavor to answer those 
questions.248 
1.  Deterrence Theory May Be Inapplicable During High-Stress 
Critical Incidents 
At first blush, it might appear self-evident that BWCs affect 
behavior.249 Consider, for example, that Professor Saul Kassin and 
 
 243. Lamar Pierce, Daniel C. Snow & Andrew Mcafee, Cleaning House: The Impact of 
Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity, 61 MGMT. SCI. 
2299, 2300 (2015). 
 244. Barry Poyner, Video Cameras and Bus Vandalism, 11 J. SEC. ADMIN. 44, 46 
(1988). 
 245. NANCY G. LA VIGNE, SAMANTHA S. LOWRY, JOSHUA MARKMAN & ALLISON 
DWYER, EVALUATING THE USE OF PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS FOR CRIME 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION xii–xiii (2011), http://www.urban.org/research/publication
/evaluating-use-public-surveillance-cameras-crime-control-and-prevention/view/full_report 
[https://perma.cc/L6N2-KD7T]. 
 246. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IN10142, CAN BODY WORN 
CAMERAS SERVE AS A DETERRENT TO POLICE MISCONDUCT? 1 (2012); see also 
STANLEY, supra note 18, at 1–2 (arguing BWCs would decrease the amount of violent 
police encounters effect while promoting police accountability); Shira A. Scheindlin & 
Peter K. Manning, Will the Widespread Use of Police Body Cameras Improve Police 
Accountability? AMERICAS Q., Spring 2015, at 24, 26 (hypothesizing the same); WHITE, 
supra note 2, at 35–36 (noting the “civilizing effect” BWCs were expected to facilitate). 
 247. See Ariel et al., supra note 138, at 294 (“Similarly, while the theory underpinning 
the effect of BWCs is relatively straightforward—deterrence theory juxtaposed with 
observer effects—estimates of the efficacy of BWC are scarce, resembling a void largely 
filled by conceptual research.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 248. Nell Greenfieldboyce, Scientists Hunt Hard Evidence on How Cop Cameras Affect 
Behavior, NPR (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/04/27
/525081998/scientists-hunt-hard-evidence-on-how-cop-cameras-affect-behavior [https://perma.cc
/9WFJ-PNMK (dark archive)]. 
 249. Although not relevant to the policy considerations attendant to citizen 
notification, it should be noted that psychological research raises a question about an 
untendered consequence of BWCs on police behavior, namely will the technology over-
deter police in what researchers have dubbed “the transparency trap.” Ethan Bernstein, 
The Transparency Trap, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2014, at 58, 58. The phenomenon occurs 
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colleagues found that recording police conduct during interrogations 
inhibits certain tactics designed to illicit confessions from suspects.250 
That study, however, occurred in the relative calm of an experimental 
field setting; it may or may not be generalizable to actual 
confessions. 251  But its generalizability beyond interrogations and 
confessions to any deterrent effect BWCs might have during critical-
incident situations is even more questionable for a few reasons. 
First, any type of “deterrence might fail if any societal condition 
exists that undermines the successful transmission or reception of the 
deterrence message.”252 That concern underpins the reason why many 
jurisdictions require or recommend that law enforcement officers 
notify the members of the public that their interactions are being 
recorded by BWCs.253 But a wide range of conditions might hamper 
the delivery of such reminders. For example, officers may not have 
time to warn citizens that they are being recorded in emergency-
response situations; indeed, they may not even have time to activate 
their BWCs in certain critical incidents.254 Moreover, depending on 
the nature of the encounter, officers and citizens alike may be so 
 
when transparency stifles innovative behavior and decreases productivity as a function of 
the observed person doing only what is expected of them and no more. See id. This 
phenomenon might mean that police sacrifice “the kind of educated risk-taking and 
problem solving that’s often needed to save lives.” Howard M. Wasserman, Moral Panics 
and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831, 839 (2015) (quoting Bernstein, supra). 
 250. Saul M. Kassin, Jeff Kukucka, Victoria Z. Lawson, John DeCarlo & Margaret 
Bull Kovera, Does Video Recording Alter the Behavior of Police During Interrogation? A 
Mock Crime-and-Investigation Study, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 73, 80–81 (2014). 
 251. See id. at 81–82. 
 252. Kevin C. Kennedy, A Critical Appraisal of Criminal Deterrence Theory, 88 DICK. 
L. REV. 1, 6 (1983); see also Michael R. Geerken & Walter R. Gove, Deterrence: Some 
Theoretical Considerations, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497, 500 (1975) (“In order to be 
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hypothesized, 
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jolt individuals into thinking a little more before they act, becoming more 
deliberative and reflecting on future consequences. In short, there could be lots of 
mechanisms that account for changes in behavior when camera and verbal warning 
are used together. 
Alex Sutherland & Barak Ariel, Cameras on Cops: The Jury’s Still Out, CONVERSATION 
(Dec. 23, 2014), https://theconversation.com/cameras-on-cops-the-jurys-still-out-35644 
[https//perma.cc/H2TA-XA8D]. 
 254. See Soo Rin Kim, Turning on Body-Worn Cameras, NEWS MEDIA & L., Fall 2015, 
at 16, 16–18. 
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upset they forget they are being recorded because acute stress impairs 
working memory—the part of short-term memory responsible for 
immediate conscious perceptual and linguistic processing.255 
Second, like criminal deterrence generally, 256  the presumed 
deterrent effect of BWCs on undesirable officer and citizen behavior 
alike is premised on rational thought. But that premise may be 
inapplicable not only to particular people (such as people with certain 
types of mental illness)257 but also during critical incidents in which 
emotion and instinct might overwhelm rationality under the stress of 
the situation.258 Indeed, rational thought is inevitably impaired when 
people are in fear for their lives; in such situations, the fight-or-flight 
response kicks in.259  
Third, as Wikström explained, “rationality and an individual’s 
capability to exercise self-control come into play as factors only when 
an individual deliberates over action alternatives.”260 In contrast, if 
one acts out of habit, rather than deliberate choice, then deterrence 
can be significantly undermined. Because people are often creatures 
of habit, 261  the presumed deterrent effect of BWCs may be 
 
 255. Mathias Luethi, Beat Meier & Carmen Sandi, Stress Effects on Working Memory, 
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 256. See JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 84–104 (1974). 
 257. See generally ROBERT SCHUG & HENRY F. FRADELLA, MENTAL ILLNESS AND 
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Disturbance (EED), Heat of Passion, and Provocation: A Jurisprudent Science Perspective, 
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 260. Per-Olof Wikström, Deterrence and Deterrence Experiences—Preventing Crime 
Through the Threat of Punishment, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF PENOLOGY 
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 345, 375 (Shlomo Giora Shoham, Ori Beck & Martin Kett eds., 
2008). 
 261. See Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning, 119 
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inapplicable to both select officers and select criminal offenders alike 
if they habitually act in ways that BWCs are supposed to deter.262 
2.  Citizen Notification of the BWC in Practice: Results from Our 
Policy Analysis 
As the preceding summary of psychological research suggests, it 
remains an open question as to whether citizen notification of BWCs 
will actually affect the behavior of the officers wearing the cameras or 
the people with whom they interact. Although the deterrent effects of 
BWCs remain to be seen, a sizable minority of law enforcement 
agencies have adopted policies requiring officers to notify members of 
the public when they are being recorded during encounters with 
police.263 Our review of policies from agencies funded through the US 
DOJ BWC program indicates that twenty-two percent of policies 
adopted in FY 2015 and thirteen percent adopted in FY 2016 have 
notification policies requiring officers to “inform all individuals 
identifiably present as soon as reasonably practical” about the 
recording. 264  In contrast, roughly forty percent of the policies 
reviewed (in both years) recommend, but do not require, citizen 
notification. 265  The remaining policies neither mandate nor 
recommend citizen notification—they simply state that notification is 
not a requirement.266 Thus, these results indicate that agencies are 
increasingly willing to leave the citizen notification decision in the 
hands of the officer.267 
This trend away from mandatory citizen notification raises 
serious questions regarding the potential for BWCs to generate a 
civilizing effect. Setting aside questions related to deterrence and 
rational thought, a camera can only reasonably be expected to change 
behavior if the citizen is aware of its presence. 
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C. Policy Issues 3 and 4: Officer and Supervisor Review of BWC 
Footage 
As previously mentioned, law enforcement agencies have been 
quick to adopt BWCs as part of a presumed solution to the crisis in 
contemporary policing. But in spite of the seemingly “world-wide 
uncontrolled social experiment” concerning their use,268 it remains 
unclear whether BWCs will help or hurt police legitimacy. The 
answer to that question is likely quite complex. After all, the varying 
responses to a number of shootings by police that were captured on 
video indicate that BWC footage may complicate police-community 
relations instead of improving them.269 Although the end result will 
turn on a multiplicity of factors in any particular case, psychological 
research suggests that post-hoc review of BWC footage may create 
more problems than it solves. 
1.  How Will Third-Parties Interpret BWC Footage? 
How will third parties (e.g., commanding officers, citizen review 
board members, prosecutors, judges, and jurors) interpret BWC 
footage? Video from BWCs does not necessarily speak for itself. As 
Professor Howard Wasserman thoughtfully explained, video footage 
from BWCs is not any more unambiguous or reliable than eyewitness 
testimony.270 Indeed, there are at least three reasons why footage may 
create disputes about the substance of what a BWC may have 
captured on audio and video. 
a. Temporal Limitations 
Obviously, BWCs cannot capture the events that occurred prior 
to the start of recording or after recording ends. Similarly, BWCs 
cannot capture footage when they are not turned on, regardless of 
whether the failure to activate them was purposeful or 
unintentional. 271  If officers are concerned with whether they 
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remembered to activate their BWCs, that worry may impact the 
officer’s ability to form detailed memories of the situation.272 Indeed, 
a number of high-profile cases in which officers claimed to have 
forgotten to activate their BWCs have led to the development of 
BWCs that start to record as soon as an officer draws a gun.273 But 
such devices still suffer from a temporal limitation insofar as their 
automatic activation does not capture potentially critical information 
concerning what occurred before a weapon is drawn. 
Even if BWCs were always activated (an approach few 
authorities recommend in light of privacy concerns and resource 
implications),274 what gets recorded may not tell the whole story since 
what transpired before officers arrive at a particular scene may be 
highly relevant to what occurs once they arrive. Moreover, as the next 
two subsections detail, what BWCs capture may be interpreted in 
dramatically different ways for a number of psychological reasons.275 
b. Field of Vision 
BWC footage’s “length, clarity, distance, angle, steadiness, scope, 
field, lighting, perspective, field of vision, and completeness all affect 
what it means.”276 This is especially important in light of the inherent 
limitations of close-range video, like that obtained from BWCs, when 
compared to better perspective of events that can be discerned from a 
wider field-of-vision.277 Consider, for example, an experiment The 
New York Times conducted278 in which a “wider field of vision 
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revealed more information about the events, showing a different, 
innocuous, even friendly encounter, compared with the video from 
the body camera alone, which suggested a more threatening event.”279 
Indeed, courts have noted this limitation of BWCs in actual cases.280 
c. Implicit Bias Affects Video Interpretation 
Another consideration in third-party interpretation of BWC 
footage is that the “[c]ultural, demographic, social, political, and 
ideological characteristics and attitudes of the viewer affect what that 
viewer sees.”281 Put differently, the implicit biases of the person 
watching video evidence will affect how the video is interpreted.282 
Consider, for example, a recent study by Roseanna Sommers in which 
she showed mock jurors actual police footage.283 She found that 
viewers’ prior attitudes toward the police significantly affected their 
interpretations of the recorded events, resulting in considerable 
polarization on a variety of dimensions.284 
2.  Participant Credibility in the Face of Differences Between 
Recorded Footage and Memory 
Will BWCs affect the credibility of officers and the people with 
whom they interact because they remember the events that occurred 
during critical incidents differently than the ways in which the 
incident appears to have unfolded as recorded? BWC footage has 
great potential to create battles concerning witness veracity for 
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reasons that have to do with the complex bio-psychosocial factors that 
affect memory. Contrary to common misperception, memories—
unlike unaltered BWC footage—are not exact recordings of events.285 
a. Perception and Its Relationship to Memory 
Perception is often viewed “in terms of our basic senses—sight, 
hearing, touch, taste, and smell. But, in reality, perception is a 
process—‘the total amalgam of sensory signals received and then 
processed by an individual at any one time.’”286 Of course, perception 
varies based on the physical environment. For example, different 
lighting, “especially back lighting, reflections, and shadows,” impacts 
people’s ability to see, particularly when it comes to fine details.287 
Yet, because perception is an “interpretive process,” psychological 
factors impact perception just as much as physical senses—even under 
optimal conditions for sensory input.288 In fact, the sensory data we 
perceive is not only dependent upon perceptual ability and attention, 
but also upon “experience, learning, preferences, biases, and 
expectations.”289 
First, perception is selective.290 We do not always perceive that 
which is there for us to see or hear, as any distracted driver can attest.  
One of the most important factors affecting our ability to 
perceive is the volume of sensory stimulation. “Perception is 
highly selective because the number of signals or amount of 
information impinging upon the senses is so great that the mind 
can process only a small fraction of the incoming data.” This 
means we focus on certain stimuli while filtering out others. 
This results not only in incomplete acquisition of sensory data, 
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but also in differential processing and interpretation of 
events.291 
Put differently, a person’s perception may be incomplete if he or she 
experiences “sensory overload”—the situation in which people are 
“overwhelmed with too much information in too short a period of 
time.”292 Accordingly, how these gaps in perception are filled is 
another important consideration with regard to perception.  Indeed, 
“[w]hen these gaps are filled, the details often fit logically, but 
inaccurately. The type of stimuli involved also affects perception. In 
particular, people are poor perceivers of duration (we tend to over-
estimate how long something takes), time (it ‘flies by’ or ‘drags on’), 
speed, distance, height, and weight.” 293  Thus, because humans 
unconsciously process sensory information, they are unaware of how 
perception may vary from person to person. Such variation, in turn, 
can affect people’s memories of critical incidents—a situation that is 
fraught with the possibility of people being interpreted as untruthful 
if their memories do not align with BWC footage. 
b. The Three Phases of Memory 
Just as perceptual processes occur unconsciously, so do the 
processes associated with memory. 294  Specifically, memory “is 
dependent upon three critical stages—acquisition/encoding, retention, 
and recall/retrieval,” all of which “are affected by a number of 
physical and psychological factors that can taint the accuracy of a 
memory.”295 
First is the acquisition (or encoding) stage. During this stage, 
“sensory data, as perceived by the individual, are encoded in the 
appropriate areas of the cerebral cortex.” 296  Thus, because 
“perception itself is a process dependent on a number of 
individualized factors, this stage in the process of developing 
memories is affected by those same factors,” including sensory 
overload.297 Indeed, in this stage, sensory overload can be so extreme 
that it leads to “confabulation”—“the creation or substitution of false 
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memories through later suggestion.”298  Additionally, “[a] person's 
expectations influence the way in which details about an event are 
encoded. An observer tends to seek out some information and avoid 
other information, an effect called the confirmation bias. What gets 
encoded is, therefore, partially dependent on that for which the 
observer was looking.”299 
Next is the retention (or storage) phase, during which “the brain 
stores the memory until it is called upon for retrieval.”300 The amount 
of data being encoded and retained therefore affects this phase: “The 
greater the amount of data presented, especially in shorter periods of 
time, the less that will be retained.” 301  Exposure to subsequent 
information is also relevant to retention and storage of memory.302 In 
what psychology refers to as the “post-event misinformation effect,” 
exposure to post-event misinformation can lead people to accept that 
misinformation “as if it were an accurate account.”303 
The final phase is the retrieval phase, during which “the brain 
searches for the pertinent information, retrieves it, and communicates 
it.”304 As the name of this phase implies, retrieval occurs whenever 
police or members of the public describe what they recall having 
occurred during an encounter, including when testifying in court.305 
Time is one of the most salient factors affecting the ability to recall 
information from memory: “As a rule, the longer the time period 
between acquisition, retention, and retrieval, the more difficulty we 
have retrieving the memory.” 306  Additionally, “unconscious 
transference”––a process in which “different memory images may 
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become combined or confused with one another”307—also affects the 
retrieval of memories. 
Because each of the three phases of memory can be affected by 
the aforementioned factors, any given person’s memory of what 
transpired during a particular incident may not align with what is 
captured by BWCs. This disconnect demonstrates additional 
psychological reasons why BWC footage might be misinterpreted by 
judges and jurors as evidence that someone is being dishonest. 
c. Event Factors that Affect Memory 
Memories of an event are also affected by a number of factors 
related to the event itself. Psychological research has identified a 
number of critical event factors that affect memory formation, 
including time,308 the effect of injuries,309 whether participants have 
alcohol or drugs in their system, 310  the presence or absence of 
violence,311 the role of the participant,312 and how much stress the 
event caused the participant to experience.313 Traumatic events, in 
 
 307. Fradella, supra note 270, at 8 (citing John C. Brigham, Adina W. Wasserman & 
Christian A. Meissner, Disputed Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Important Legal and 
Scientific Issues, 36 CT. REV. 12, 15 (1999)). 
 308. Id. at 9–10 (“[T]he longer one has to examine something, the better the memory 
formation will be and the more accurate recall will be. Conversely, the less time someone 
has to witness an event, the less complete—and less accurate—both perception and 
memory will be .	.	.	. Given the limitations of human perception, when things happen very 
quickly, memory can be negatively affected. This is true even when someone has a 
reasonable period of time to observe an event insofar as attention is focused on processing 
a fast-moving series of events, rather than on a particular aspect of the occurrence.” 
(footnotes omitted)).  
 309. REISBERG, supra note 290, at 54–55 (noting how loss of blood can disrupt 
memory and perception while the event is occurring, as well as retroactively). 
 310. Id. at 55–59 (explaining how drugs and alcohol can disrupt both the formation of 
new memories and the recall of older memories). 
 311. For example, if a weapon is present during a critical incident, participant attention 
is usually drawn to the weapon at the expense of event details. Id. at 47. For a review of 
the “weapon focus” effect, see generally Kerri L. Pickel, The Influence of Context on the 
“Weapon Focus” Effect, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 299 (1999). 
 312. Indeed, most people do not remember events accurately; rather, memories are 
“very personal and self-serving” insofar as they help people make sense of themselves and 
their own experiences in relation to the rest of the world—a phenomenon described as the 
“inevitable wrong focus of autobiographical memory.” Haber & Haber, supra note 287, at 
1066–68. 
 313. REISBERG, supra note 290, at 60; see also Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, Brian H. 
Bornstein, Steven D. Penrod & E. Kiernan McGorty, A Meta-Analytic Review of the 
Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness Memory 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 699 (2004) 
(“[W]e have adduced considerable support for the hypothesis that high levels of stress 
negatively impact both accuracy of eyewitness identification as well as accuracy of recall of 
crime-related details.”); Louis S. Katz & Jeremiah F. Reid, Expert Testimony on the 
Fallibility of Eyewitness Identification, 1 CRIM. JUST. J. 177, 184–86 (1977) (“When an 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1579 (2018) 
2018] LAW, POLICY & BODY CAMERAS 1631 
particular, can lead to “dramatic alterations in memory 
functioning.” 314  Although the particular mechanisms of memory 
impairment are not well understood, many psychologists and 
neuroscientists nonetheless share the view that trauma (or associated 
posttraumatic symptoms) can significantly interfere with normal 
memory functioning through “memory fragmentation or 
disorganization[,] .	.	. the dissociation of trauma memories from other 
autobiographical memories[,] .	.	. increased susceptibility to memory 
distortion[,] or impaired retrieval of memories of specific 
autobiographical events.”315 
Collectively, the event factors that affect memory encoding, 
retention, and retrieval suggest that the way in which police officers 
and members of the public remember particular critical incidents may 
differ significantly from what is captured on video by BWCs, even 
though participants may sincerely believe what they recall to be 
completely accurate. Because such differences between people’s 
recollections and BWC footage might be interpreted as grounds to 
doubt witnesses’ veracity, precautions may need to be taken to ensure 
that judges and jurors understand the psychological phenomena that 
affect perception and memory. Because jury instructions have often 
proven insufficient in helping triers-of-fact understand the 
complexities of perception and memory in the realm of eyewitness 
(mis)identifications,316 expert testimony may be needed to help jurors 
understand why BWC footage may not align with what critical 
incident participants recall. 
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3.  Policy Implications 
The foregoing questions about the interpretation of BWC 
footage and the potential credibility concerns that such a review may 
unmask when footage is compared to an officer’s notes or recollection 
about a critical incident give rise to another important policy 
question: should officers be permitted to review footage from BWCs 
prior to writing an official police report or giving a statement about a 
critical incident? The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has 
argued that the answer is no, because allowing officers such access 
“enables lying,” “undermines the legitimacy of investigations,” 
“enables cross-contamination of evidence,” and generally “impedes 
the search for truth.”317 
Intentional misrepresentations aside, the psychological issues 
outlined throughout this Section support the ACLU’s position. 
Specifically, if officers are allowed to review video footage prior to 
writing a report or giving a statement for an investigation, all the 
aforementioned issues concerning field of vision limitations and 
implicit bias are likely to shape what officers write in their reports or 
say in their statements, which can result in distortions being presented 
as sincerely-believed fact. These distortions may be particularly 
salient in critical incidents involving the use of potentially lethal force. 
Consider, for example, that criminologists David Klinger and Rod 
Brunson examined the detailed accounts of eighty police officers 
involved in “113 incidents in which they shot citizens.”318 Their study 
found that officers experience multiple types of perceptual 
distortions—including visual, auditory, and temporal—that may cause 
officers to behave in a manner inconsistent with the “objective reality 
of what is occurring at the time they decide to pull the trigger,” and 
instead based on “an altered conception of reality.”319 
On the other hand, if officers are not permitted to review footage 
before writing a report, any conflicts that arise between an officer’s 
memory—including those that may be based upon perceptual 
distortions experienced during a potentially lethal use of force 
incident—and BWC footage “can cause an officer to lose credibility 
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or be accused of lying if, for example, an officer’s memory is not 
accurate about some of the critical details of an encounter.”320 This 
possibility led the prominent Police Executive Research Forum 
(“PERF”) to recommend that officers involved in critical incidents 
recorded on BWCs be permitted to view the footage before giving an 
official statement about the incident.321 The ACLU counters that 
allowing such access constitutes poor investigative practice: “Any 
detective would be the first to say that it’s hardly a solid investigative 
practice to let the subject of an investigation view the video evidence 
you have over and over before you even ask them what happened.”322 
4.  Officer Review of BWC Footage in Practice: Results from Our 
Policy Analysis 
Our review of policies for federally funded agencies indicates 
that upwards of ninety-eight percent of departments routinely allow 
officers to review BWC footage for report writing purposes.323 In fact, 
many departments encourage their officers to “review BWC media 
prior to completing any investigative reports.”324 In contrast, this 
uniformity among departments is lacking in the context of officer 
review of BWC footage following a use of force incident or after a 
complaint is filed against an officer. Between one quarter and one 
third of agencies funded in FYs 2015 and 2016, respectively, permit 
officers “unrestricted access to their BWC footage during an 
administrative investigation.”325 A more common policy, however, is 
to require officers to satisfy certain stipulations—such as a union 
representative (and/or a commanding officer) being present––before 
allowing them to access the footage. 326  This conditional review 
approach was adopted by sixty-six percent of agencies in FY 2015 and 
fifty-six percent in FY 2016.327 
Review following critical incidents is generally subject to 
different standards. Fewer than five percent and nine percent of 
agencies funded in FYs 2015 and 2016, respectively, explicitly prohibit 
an officer from reviewing his or her BWC footage until after a 
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statement is given.328 That is to say, the overwhelming majority of 
agencies allow their officers to review BWC footage of a critical 
incident prior to giving a statement. 
5.  Supervisory Review of BWC Footage in Practice: Results from 
Our Policy Analysis 
What should happen with the footage captured by BWCs? This 
complex question raises a number of distinct concerns, many of which 
have already been ably delineated elsewhere. For example, scholars, 
civil rights organizations, and policy think tanks have already weighed 
in on the need for data retention and public disclosure policies that 
attempt to strike a balance between transparency and accountability 
on the one hand and the preservation of privacy and the risk of 
function creep on the other.329 We focus on a different question—
namely supervisory review of BWC use. 
There have been numerous high-profile cases in which officers 
failed to activate their BWCs under circumstances when they were 
required to do so. Consider the recent example of Australian Justine 
Damond, who was fatally shot in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on July 15, 
2017: 
[E]ven though officials .	.	. gave a brief account of the 
shooting—saying that officers were startled by a loud noise 
right before Damond approached their car—her final moments 
remain shrouded in mystery, in part because the two officers 
who encountered Damond did not turn on their body cameras 
as they arrived at the scene, preventing any video from 
capturing what happened.330 
Since 2014, there have been more than a dozen similarly tragic 
cases in which law enforcement officers did not activate their BWCs 
even though departmental policies required their use under the 
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relevant circumstances.331 What should happen to officers under such 
circumstances? Certainly, prosecutors will review such cases and 
make a determination as to whether officers violated any criminal 
laws.332 But what should command-level personnel do to address the 
situations when officers fail to activate the BWCs—especially in light 
of research demonstrating low levels of activation compliance,333 
perhaps as a function of significant numbers of officers not viewing 
BWCs as a legitimate tool for police accountability?334 
Our review of BWC policies for federally funded agencies 
identified three common methods of supervisor review.335 First, nearly 
all agencies funded in FYs 2015 and 2016 (ninety-four percent and 
ninety-nine percent, respectively) “allow first-line supervisors to 
access and review the BWC footage of their officers as part of 
administrative investigations, such as in response to a citizen 
complaint or use of force.”336 Second, supervisors were allowed to 
randomly or periodically review BWC footage “to insure compliance 
with BWC policy and procedures” in fifty percent and ninety-three 
percent of agencies funded in FYs 2015 and 2016, respectively.337 
Third, nearly two-thirds of 2015-funded agencies and ninety-three 
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percent of 2016-funded agencies permit supervisors to review BWC 
footage for “general performance” purposes––i.e., for reasons 
unrelated to the use of the BWC.338 
CONCLUSION: APPLYING A DISCRETION-CONTROL FRAMEWORK TO 
BWC USE 
Since the summer of 2014, a series of police killings of citizens 
have generated public protest, civil disorder, and widespread demand 
for police reform.339 In response, BWCs have emerged as a potential 
solution to the police-community relations crisis.340 Though cameras 
have diffused rapidly, the current body of research, detailed 
throughout this Article, suggests that implementation of a BWC 
program comes with a high degree of difficulty, and the consequences 
of implementation failure are significant. 
This Article informs the continued diffusion of police BWCs 
through a detailed examination of the research and resources 
available for program planning, implementation, and management. 
The authors first addressed the mixed body of research on BWCs and 
the US DOJ best-practice resources for program planning and 
implementation341 and for policy development.342 With this as context, 
the authors then critically examined four controversial policy 
positions related to BWC use: the activation decision, citizen 
notification, officer authority to review, and supervisor authority to 
review. For each, we described a complex set of issues that serve as a 
backdrop for the BWC policy position. We then examined prevailing 
policy trends based on a review of 129 BWC policies from agencies 
that have been funded by the US DOJ. 
The results of our policy analysis for these four positions were 
mixed. In some cases, the directionality of agency policy positions is 
consistent with our review of the research on the complex issues 
underlying the policy position. For example, agency positions on the 
activation decision appear to be in line with jurisprudence on citizens’ 
expectation of privacy and requirements for consent to record.343 In at 
least one case, however, the prevailing policy trend is not supported 
by the research examining the underlying issues. More specifically, 
policies examined here commonly allow for officer review of BWC 
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footage of a critical incident before requiring that officer to give a 
formal statement about the event. 344  This policy position is 
inconsistent with the body of evidence on third-party interpretation of 
video, implicit bias, perception, and memory.345 The review of these 
controversial policy positions highlights the critical importance of 
adhering to the US DOJ guidance on planning and implementation, 
which addresses all of the issues at hand, as well as a thoughtful, 
deliberate, and collaborative policy development process. 
Formal BWC policy notwithstanding, law enforcement agencies 
will need to focus their attention on officer compliance with laws and 
policies concerning BWC use. Officers’ failure to follow BWC 
policy—whether it be for activation, citizen notification, or 
officer/supervisor review—will undermine the goals of the BWC 
program and may exacerbate problems between police and citizens. 
The authors view officer use of BWCs as an exercise in police 
discretion. Through such a lens, BWC use can and should be 
regulated using the tools that have proven effective to regulating the 
exercise of other forms of police discretion. 
Among the wide range of conclusions drawn from numerous 
studies conducted on how to impact officers’ situational decision-
making during officer-citizen encounters,346 one empirically evident 
fact is that combating police misconduct is complex and goes far 
beyond quick fixes (e.g., increased training) or removing a few 
“rotten apples” that consistently make poor decisions.347 Additionally, 
various aspects of police culture can further inhibit attempts to stem 
police misconduct at the department level, considering that 
“[r]esearch has consistently demonstrated the powerful nature of the 
informal police culture, particularly with regard to how it can shape 
officer behavior in the field and how difficult it is to change.”348 
However, the larger body of research on police discretion offers 
numerous lessons that can guide effective BWC policy and practice. 
Police departments should consider adopting changes reflective of the 
conventional wisdom from nearly five decades of research on police 
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discretion. This body of research, which has been reviewed 
elsewhere,349 centers on: 
 Careful selection of personnel (screening out those are ill-
suited for the profession, and screening in those with desired 
qualities or characteristics);  
 Effective training that is realistic and career-long; 
 Administrative policies that are clear, detailed, and enforced; 
 Appropriate supervision and accountability. 
Law enforcement agencies that ground their BWC programs in the 
lessons from this literature are more likely to both experience positive 
outcomes and avoid the pitfalls described in this Article. They will 
also be more likely achieve the goals that prompted their initial 
decision to implement a BWC program. 
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